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First Amendment Based Copyright Misuse 
 
David S. Olson
*
 
 
Abstract 
We are at a crossroads with respect to the under-developed equitable defense of 
copyright misuse. The defense may go the way of its sibling, antitrust-based patent 
misuse, which seems to be in a state of inevitable decline. Or—if judges accept the 
proposal of this Article—courts could reinvigorate the copyright misuse defense to better 
protect First Amendment speech that is guaranteed by statute, but that is often chilled by 
copyright holders misusing their copyrights to control other‘s speech.  
The Copyright Act serves First Amendment interests by encouraging authors to 
create works. But copyright law can also discourage the creation of new works by 
preventing subsequent creators from using copyrighted work to make their own, new 
speech. Courts have long recognized this inherent tension, and have also recognized that 
the conflict should sometimes be decided in favor of allowing a subsequent speaker the 
right to make unauthorized use of others‘ copyrighted works. Accordingly, courts 
created, and Congress codified, the fair use defense to copyright infringement, which 
allows unauthorized use of copyrighted works under certain circumstances that encourage 
speech and creation of transformative works. The problem with fair use, however, is that 
the informational uncertainties and transaction costs of litigating the defense make the 
fair use right unavailable to many as a practical matter. Subsequent creators are left open 
to intimidation by copyright holders threatening infringement suits. By decoupling the 
copyright misuse defense from its basis in antitrust principles and basing it in First 
Amendment speech principles, the legal protections for fair use shift from theoretical 
rights to practical rights for many. Copyright misuse has two deterrent features that will 
allow fair use as a practical right.  First, a copyright holder‘s misuse of its copyrights 
against anyone can be used to prove the defense of misuse. Second, once misuse is found, 
the copyright owner loses its ability to enforce its copyright against everyone, at least 
until the misuse is cured. Thus, by defining as copyright misuse the unjustified chilling of 
speech that some copyright holders perpetrate, the misuse defense will encourage 
important speech rights that are currently under-protected.   
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Introduction 
We are at a crossroads with respect to the under-developed equitable defense of 
copyright misuse. The defense may go the way of its sibling, antitrust-based patent 
misuse, which seems to be in a state of inevitable decline. Or—if judges accept the 
proposal of this Article—courts could reinvigorate the copyright misuse defense to make 
it serve as a protector of statutorily guaranteed First Amendment speech. 
The Copyright Act serves First Amendment interests by encouraging authors to 
create works. The Copyright Act grants authors exclusive rights to their works, and thus, 
if they create works that the public is willing to buy, they can profit from their creations. 
But copyright law can also deter speech, and discourage the creation of new works, by 
preventing subsequent creators from using copyrighted work to make their own, new 
speech.
1
 Courts have long recognized this inherent tension, and have also recognized that 
the conflict should sometimes be decided in favor of allowing a subsequent use of 
another‘s copyrighted work. For instance, there is a strong First Amendment interest in 
allowing rival politicians to quote their opponents‘ speeches when campaigning for office 
without permission. There are similar strong First Amendment interests in critique or 
commentary on books, articles, plays, music, visual art, and other forms of expression, as 
well as in the quotations of historical and literary figures in works analyzing such figures. 
Any effective commentary, critique, or scholarship will generally need to quote the works 
being analyzed. Courts recognized early on, however, that if copyright owners could 
prohibit quotations from their works by critics and commentators, only favorable 
commentators would ever be given permission to quote from copyrighted works, and free 
speech would be curtailed.  
It was because of this recognized value of the speech interests involved in the 
unauthorized use of copyrighted works that courts created,
2
 and Congress later codified, 
                                                 
1
 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003). 
2
 See Lorelei Ritchie de Larena, What Copyright Teaches Patent Law About “Fair Use” 
and Why Universities are Ignoring the Lesson, 84 OR. L. REV. 779, 799-800 (2005) 
(―while the copyright doctrine of fair use was not codified by Congress until 1976, the 
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the fair use defense to copyright infringement.
3
 The statutory test for fair use sets out four 
factors for analyzing whether an unauthorized use of a copyrighted work is socially 
valuable enough to overcome whatever harm it does to the (mostly financial) interests of 
the copyright holder in preventing use of his work.
4
 I believe that the fair use test does an 
admirable job of setting out the factors a court should consider to determine whether an 
unauthorized use of a copyrighted work should be allowed. 
The problem with the fair use test, however, is that while it looks great on paper, 
the informational uncertainties and transaction costs of litigating to a fair use 
determination make the fair use right unavailable to many as a practical matter. The fair 
use test requires detailed consideration of the copyright and speech interests at issue.
5
 The 
nuance and sensitivity of the test often make it difficult for parties to know their legal 
rights without litigating.
6
 This level of uncertainty leaves those who would make 
probable fair use of a copyrighted work vulnerable to threats of copyright infringement.
7
 
The possibility of being assessed statutory damages and attorneys‘ fees that can be many 
multiples above any actual damages further deters people from making fair use of 
copyrighted material.
8
 And in the most egregious cases, copyright holders can deter 
obvious fair use by threatening to sue the user of their copyrighted works because the 
cost of defending a fair use suit is quite high.  
This unfortunate situation is well known in copyright literature,
9
 and 
commentators have made numerous suggestions regarding how to change copyright law 
or the fair use defense to alleviate this problem.
10
 Suggested legislative changes have for 
                                                                                                                                                 
doctrine existed previously in common law‖).  
3
 17 U.S.C. § 107.  
4
 Id. The four factors are: (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such 
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of 
the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to 
the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market 
for or value of the copyrighted work. 
5
 Id.  
6
  See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE 
LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 292 (2004).  
7
 John A. Fonstad, Comment, Protecting Fair Use with Fogerty: Toward a New Dual 
Standard, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 623, 635 (2007).   
8
 Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy 
in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 443 (2009). 
9
 See Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087, 1096, 1099 (2007); J. 
Cam Barker, Note, Grossly Excessive Penalties in the Battle Against Illegal File-
Sharing: The Troubling Effects of Aggregating Minimum Statutory Damages for 
Copyright Infringement, 83 TEX. L. REV. 525, 526 (2004) (―[T]he resulting penalty [for 
infringement] can become so large that it becomes grossly excessive in relation to any 
legitimate interest in punishment and deterrence.‖); see generally Ben Depoorter, 
Technology and Uncertainty: The Shaping Effect on Copyright Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 
1831, 1859-60 (2009); Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 8 at 443; Carroll, supra note 
7 at 1096, 1099; R. Polk Wagner, The Perfect Storm: Intellectual Property and Public 
Values, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 423, 429 (2005).   
10
 See infra notes 126 - 149 and accompanying text. 
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the most part fallen on deaf ears, however. This is not surprising given that content 
owners have more organization and lobbying power than diverse persons who would like 
to make fair use of copyrighted works.
11
 And while some of the suggested changes to 
judging fair use cases may yet be adopted by courts,
12
 the chasm between statutory and 
practical fair use rights remains wide. 
Sophisticated copyright owners know this, and they are able to misuse their 
copyrights—by threatening litigation without a good-faith basis, or by tying demands for 
editorial control to licenses to use their works—in order to make practically unavailable 
those fair use rights that are explicitly granted by law. A solution—or at least a partial 
solution—is available, however. The solution I propose would not require any changes to 
the substantive rights of copyright holders or of fair users.
13
 Each person‘s rights would 
be exactly as they are set out by statute. Instead, my proposal would increase the practical 
availability of the statutorily-granted fair use right.  
―Copyright misuse‖ currently exists as an underdeveloped equitable defense to 
copyright infringement. The problem is that the defense developed as an analog to 
―patent misuse,‖ and like patent misuse, courts tend to focus primarily on antitrust issues 
in determining whether the copyright misuse defense should apply. I argue in this Article 
that copyright misuse should be decoupled from its basis in antitrust principles, and 
instead should be based primarily in First Amendment speech principles. This would be 
beneficial for two reasons. First, antitrust-based copyright misuse may inevitably be on 
the decline due to a strong attack on the misuse defense (whether in patent or copyright 
cases) by critics who argue that antitrust concerns are poorly addressed through the 
misuse defense. Second, just as antitrust concerns can be addressed directly by antitrust 
law, the chilling of legally protected First Amendment speech by aggressive copyright 
holders can best be curbed by a copyright misuse defense that focuses specifically on free 
speech interests. Specifically, First Amendment based copyright misuse would occur 
when a copyright holder used its copyright to (1) threaten litigation in the face of obvious 
fair use, (2) seek to deter areas of inquiry through litigation threats, or (3) grant licenses 
to quote from or use copyrighted works only if the user grants the copyright holder 
improper editorial control.
14
 
                                                 
11
 See Fonstad, supra note 7 at 623. 
12
 See, e.g., Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REV. 409 
(2002). 
13
 Although many of the reforms that scholars have suggested to copyright law or fair use 
have merit (see infra notes 126 - 149 and accompanying text), I believe that generally 
section 107 of the Copyright Act does a fairly good job of balancing the interests of 
copyright holders and users of copyrighted works. I think the frustration that drives many 
reform proposals is that the time, expense, and uncertainty of the fair use defense make it 
easy for copyright holders to threaten litigation to deter even obvious fair use. I believe 
my proposed copyright misuse defense based in First Amendment principles would make 
fair use more practically available, and thus lessens the need for reforms to copyright law 
or fair use.  
14
 Improper editorial control would not include a copyright owner controlling the content 
of someone the copyright holder has engaged to work at its direction—such as a 
screenwriter writing a screenplay from a book. Rather, to qualify as misuse the copyright 
holder must be seeking to gain editorial control to prevent speech from being made that 
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The copyright misuse defense might not seem to pack much punch at first—after 
all why would a copyright holder care if occasionally its threats or licensing behavior is 
called unfair? But two unique features of copyright misuse as it exists currently make it a 
powerful defense. First, an accused infringer can defend on the basis of copyright misuse 
by proving that the copyright owner misused its copyright against anyone—not just 
against the defendant to the suit. Thus, if a copyright owner used its copyrights to deter 
obvious fair use by a third party unrelated to the suit being litigated, that misuse as to the 
third party would nevertheless be the grounds for a misuse finding in the current 
litigation. This means that a copyright holder would have to behave properly towards all 
users of its copyrights, not just toward whomever it chooses to sue. Second, the remedy 
for copyright misuse is that courts refuse to enforce the misuser‘s copyrights against 
anyone. The misuser may eventually cure the misuse and make its copyrights enforceable 
again, but in the meantime it will not be allowed to enforce its copyrights against even 
blatant infringers. For copyright owners making significant income from their copyrights, 
this will serve as a significant incentive to avoid behavior even near the line of misuse.  
I begin in Part I by giving examples to show the severity of the problem and the 
ways in which constitutionally protected speech that qualifies as fair use is deterred under 
the current regime. In Part II, I discuss the way that the legal right to fair use is often not 
practically available. Specifically, I consider the current dynamics of copyright law that 
give copyright holders the ability to chill statutorily protected fair use of copyrighted 
material, while would-be fair users have few tools with which to deter overly aggressive 
copyright holders. In Part III, I review proposed reforms to better enable the actual use of 
statutorily-granted fair use rights. In Part IV, I examine the evolution of copyright misuse 
from its basis in antitrust-based patent law to the present in which a few courts have 
recognized that it is a defense that can serve interests other than antitrust, including 
public policy interests underlying copyright law. I also discuss the critiques of an 
antitrust-based misuse defense, and why these strong critiques make basing copyright 
misuse in antitrust unwise and uncertain. In Part V, I set forth the argument for basing the 
defense of copyright misuse prominently on First Amendment speech principles instead 
of on antitrust principles. I explore the implications of shifting the basis for the copyright 
misuse defense to First Amendment principles, and set forth some examples of what 
copyright misuse based firmly in the First Amendment will look like.  
I. THE (MIS)USE OF COPYRIGHT TO CHILL SPEECH AND 
INQUIRY 
The aggressive use of copyright, whether out of a desire to extract maximum 
profits for copyrighted works, or out of a desire to control others‘ speech, often leads to 
chilling of valuable speech that is, or likely would be, protected by the fair use defense to 
copyright infringement.
15
 Instances of such aggressive use of copyright without regard 
for fair use are legion,
16
 particularly when it comes to copyrights held by authors‘ estates. 
                                                                                                                                                 
the copyright owner does not like or to prevent discussion of some areas of inquiry.  
15
 Alfred C. Yen, Eldred, the First Amendment, and Aggressive Copyright Claims, 40 
Hous. L. Rev. 673, 695 (2003).  
16
 See id. at 677-78. Estates may be more aggressive in all aspects of copyright 
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For example, the Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr. has been criticized for demanding 
payments for use of Dr. King‘s words from news media and historians who use excerpts 
from King‘s speeches, many of which uses are plainly fair use.17  
Sometimes the King Estate seems to simply be threatening litigation so that it can 
be paid a license fee for use of its copyrights. Of course the Estate has a right to be paid 
for uses of its copyrighted works, but the Estate seems to seek fees indiscriminately in 
cases of commercialization and of protected fair use alike. In 2000, the Estate settled a 
four-year litigation against CBS, in which the King Estate had sought to enjoin CBS from 
using footage CBS had shot of Dr. King‘s famous ―I Have a Dream‖ speech in a 
documentary.
18
 Although the settlement terms were confidential, the parties reported that 
CBS would retain the right to use the footage in exchange for a contribution of an 
undisclosed amount to the Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Non-Violent Social Change 
in Atlanta.
19
 Just after Barack Obama‘s election as president in 2008, the King Estate said 
that it was considering suing unauthorized sellers of merchandise showing King and 
Obama with slogans like ―The Dream Is Reality.‖20 These are particularly aggressive 
moves given that short phrases like ―I have a dream‖ are not covered by copyright law,21 
                                                                                                                                                 
enforcement in part because the pressures on trustees of authors‘ estates to maximize 
revenue from the estates‘ copyrights may be greater than the pressure on an author 
herself. An author can agree that a use is fair, or can be permitted pursuant to a royalty-
free license, without worrying that she will be criticized and perhaps held liable for not 
maximizing revenue from her copyrights. A trustee of an author‘s estate, however, both 
has a fiduciary duty to the estate, and may have financially-motivated beneficiaries of the 
estate looking over his shoulder and second-guessing decisions to forgo revenue that 
might have been available through use of aggressive techniques with regard to 
copyrighted works. For excellent discussions of how authors‘ estates continue to exercise 
control over copyrighted works after an author dies, see Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, 
Copyright on Catfish Row: Musical Borrowing, Porgy and Bess, and Unfair Use, 37 
RUTGERS L.J. 277, 315-327 (2006); Justin Hughes, Fair Use Across Time, 50 UCLA L. 
REV. 775, 794 (2003); RAY MADOFF, IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW: THE RISING POWER OF 
THE AMERICAN DEAD 144-46 (2010).  
17
 Robbie Brown, King Estate Considering Suit Over Unlicensed Obama Items, N.Y. 
TIMES, November 15, 2008, at A9 (―In recent years, the King family has come under 
criticism from . . . scholars who believe that the family is being overprotective of Dr. 
King‘s legacy, in particular for suing news organizations and historians who use excerpts 
from his speeches without paying the family.‖). 
18
 King Estate Settles Lawsuit Against CBS Over Rights To „I Have A Dream‟ Speech, 
JET, July 31, 2000 available at  
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1355/is_8_98/ai_63974332/?tag=content;col1. 
19
 Id. 
20
 Robbie Brown, King Estate Considering Suit Over Unlicensed Obama Items, N.Y. 
TIMES, November 15, 2008, at A9 (―Isaac Newton Farris Jr., a nephew of Dr. King and 
president of the King Center in Atlanta, said the family was considering several options, 
including lawsuits against sellers of unauthorized merchandise linking Mr. Obama and 
Dr. King under slogans like ‗The Dream Is Reality.‘ ‗It‘s not about the money,‘ Mr. 
Farris said. . . . But he added, ‗We do feel that if somebody‘s out there making a dollar, 
we should make a dime.‘‖).  
21
 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (2004) (copyright law bars the copyrighting of ―[w]ords and short 
phrases such as names, titles, and slogans; familiar symbols or designs; mere variations 
of typographic ornamentation, lettering or coloring; mere listing of ingredients or 
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and that the copyright in photographs taken by news reporter and others not working for 
the subject of the photograph is held by the photographer.
22
 
Other authors‘ estates have proved equally controlling of copyrights in a manner 
that is likely to discourage fair use. The Gershwin Estate is reportedly extremely 
aggressive in seeking to maximize revenues from its copyrights, while strictly controlling 
how its copyrighted work may be used.
23
 The Estate of T.S. Eliot is controlled by the 
author‘s widow, Valerie Eliot, who is famously controlling of Eliot‘s work so as to guard 
his reputation.
24
 Scholars are reportedly tremulous in seeking permissions from Mrs. 
Eliot.
25
 Likewise, the Estate of Samuel Beckett is controlled by the author‘s nephew, 
Edward Beckett, who will not allow uses of the author‘s work that he says the author 
would not have wanted.
26
 In the end, the power over copyright given to authors and their 
estates is all too often abused to censor and control the next generation of scholars and 
authors in ways that in practice overstep the statutorily delineated bounds between 
protection for creation (the copyright grant) and protection of new speech (the statutorily 
allowed fair uses without copyright holder permission).
27
 
A prime example of persistent copyright misuse is the Estate of James Joyce‘s 
history of aggressive use of copyright claims to stifle the speech of others. In the 
remainder of this section, I provide a detailed summary of how copyright was misused by 
the Joyce Estate in an attempt to squelch scholarly speech, and how the defense of 
copyright misuse eventually helped protect such speech. This case study will provide an 
excellent opportunity to identify the weakness in our current copyright regime, and 
explore a plausible solution: a defense of copyright misuse based on First Amendment 
policies. 
                                                                                                                                                 
contents.‖).  
22
 See Jeffrey D. Powell, Printers‟ Claims to Lithographic Film Ownership: You Can‟t 
Always Get What You Want, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 783, 790-91 (copyright belongs to 
photographer unless the work was commissioned by the subject of the photograph).  
23
 See Arewa, supra note 16, at 315-27 (2006).  
24
 See Karen Christensen, Dear Mrs. Eliot . . ., THE GUARDIAN, Saturday January 29, 
2005, Features & Reviews section at 4. See also Rebecca F. Ganz, Note, A Portrait of the 
Artist‟s Estate as a Copyright Problem, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 739, 752 (2008) (pointing 
out the ―powerful position given to heirs and estates in our present system‖) (quoting 
Pierre N. Leval, Towards a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1118 (1990) 
(―A historian who wishes to quote personal papers of deceased public figures now must 
satisfy heirs and executors for [years] after the subject‘s death. When writers ask 
permission, the answer will be, ‗Show me what you write. Then we‘ll talk about 
permission.‘ If the manuscript does not exude pure admiration, permission will be 
denied.‖). 
25
 Id. 
26
 Mel Gussow, A Reading Upsets Beckett‟s Estate, N.Y. TIMES, September 24, 1994, at 
11. 
27
 For a discussion of the problem, see Ganz, supra note 24 (―Although certain estates 
will elect to do the right thing in allowing or even enabling creative uses of copyrighted 
works, without a legally enforceable system, many famous estates will continue to abuse 
their power and censor the work of another generation of artists and scholars.‖). 
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The Estate of author James Joyce controls the copyrights in Joyce‘s works. The 
Estate today is controlled by Joyce‘s grandson, Stephen James Joyce, who is well-known 
for his contempt for Joyce scholars.
28
 Since he gained control of the Estate, it has 
engaged in aggressive use of its copyrights to try to curtail speech about topics—literary 
or personal—it does not like. The Estate has done so by refusing to grant permission to 
quote from Joyce‘s work to anyone who would use Joyce‘s work in a way Stephen Joyce 
dislikes, or to discuss topics about Joyce and the Joyce family that Stephen Joyce 
dislikes. If refusing to grant copyright permission is not enough to get his way, Stephen 
Joyce has not been hesitant to use litigation and especially the threats of litigation, even 
in plain cases of fair use.  
Numerous examples of the Joyce Estate‘s desire to control the content of Joyce 
scholars‘ work via threatening and litigious behavior exist.29 For example, Stephen James 
Joyce objected to an epilogue in Brenda Maddox‘s biography of James Joyce‘s wife, 
Nora, because the biography discussed the time Joyce‘s daughter, Lucia, spent in a 
mental institution.
30
 Stephen Joyce took the position that all quotations from Joyce‘s 
work that Maddox used in her book needed to be licensed, and he threatened to withhold 
permission and sue if Maddox used the quotations without removing the material about 
Lucia Joyce.
31
 Maddox responded by removing the section even though copies of the 
book had already been printed.
32
  
While Stephen Joyce‘s position was aggressive, it is true that Great Britain, where 
Maddox lives and where her work was being published, does not have the more extensive 
fair use protections available to users of copyrighted works that are available in the 
United States.
33
 So in Britain Stephen Joyce may have been within his legal rights to tie 
granting permission to quote from Joyce‘s works to the requirement that Maddox not 
discuss Lucia Joyce. But regardless of Joyce‘s rights in Britain, in the United States 
scholars have fair use rights to use quotes from the people and texts they are analyzing.
34
 
The use cannot be excessive. They cannot take more than is needed for their purpose. But 
                                                 
28
 See D.T. Max, The Injustice Collector, NEW YORKER, June 19, 2006 at 2-3 (quoting 
Stephen Joyce ―Academics, he declared, were like ‗rats and lice—they should be 
exterminated!‘‖) available at  
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/06/19/060619fa_fact?currentPage=all.   
29
 See id. at 1, 4; Peter Carty, Never on a Bloomsday, THE INDEPENDENT (UK), Jan 12, 
2000, available at 2000 WLNR 5854888; see also Tim Cavanaugh, Portrait of the Old 
Man as a Copyright Miser, L.A. Times, June 5, 2007, available at 
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/web/la-oew-cavanaugh5jun05,0,4847685.story. 
30
 Max, supra note 28, at 1. 
31
 Shloss Decl. ¶ 65.  
32
 Max, supra note 28, at 1. 
33
 See Susanna Monseau, “Fit for Purpose”: Why the European Union Should Not 
Extend the Term of Related Rights Protection in Europe, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 629, 643 (2009). 
34
 Jennifer Lehman, The Future of Unpublished Works in Copyright Law After the Fair 
Use Amendment, 18 J. CORP. L. 619, 620 (1993) (―When an infringement suit is brought, a 
fair use defense may be raised by the alleged infringer. This affirmative defense allows a 
defendant to avoid liability for copying the copyrighted work, so long as it is used for 
‗purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . . , scholarship, or 
research.‘‖) (Internal citations omitted).  
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they certainly have the right to use quotations from works liberally as required and 
assuming the fair use factors are met.
35
 Maddox‘s quotations would therefore likely have 
been fair use in the United States. But the Joyce Estate‘s interaction with Maddox 
illustrates another behavior that is currently allowed by law, but that I will suggest in Part 
V should be copyright misuse—granting permission to quote from one‘s copyrighted 
works on condition that the person quoting the work write as the copyright holder 
dictates. This plainly discourages free speech and inquiry, and the case of the Joyce 
Estate with Maddox shows that copyright holders will feel free to user their copyrights to 
discourage such speech unless they are forbidden to do so. 
In another example, the Estate stopped an Irish composer from using a mere 
eighteen words from Finnegans Wake in a choral piece by claiming that copyright 
permission was needed to use the words, and withholding such permission. The reason 
permission was refused was apparently because Stephen Joyce did not like the music.
36
 
Using eighteen words to make a transformative choral piece plainly qualifies as fair use 
in the United States.   
Most pertinent to the inquiry of this Article is the case of Shloss v. Estate of 
James Joyce.
37
 In 2006, Professor Carol Loeb Shloss sued the Estate of James Joyce for a 
declaratory judgment that she had the right under 17 U.S.C. §107 (fair use) to put 
quotations from James Joyce‘s work on her website to support the theses of her book 
about Joyce‘s daughter titled Lucia Joyce:  To Dance in the Wake.38 The Joyce Estate 
settled favorably to her nine months later. While Professor Shloss‘s fair use arguments 
were strong, it is likely that the Estate settled so quickly because of another count in 
Shloss‘s complaint—her count accusing the Estate of copyright misuse. 39  
Carol Shloss, a professor of English at Stanford University,
40
 began researching a 
book on James Joyce‘s daughter, Lucia, in 1988.41 Lucia Joyce was reportedly a troubled 
young woman, and she was treated by a number of doctors in her twenties, including 
psychiatrist Carl Jung.
42
 In 1932, at the age of 25, Lucia was committed to a mental 
hospital by her brother, Giorgio.
43
 She was confined to mental hospitals most of her life 
                                                 
35
 Id. 
36
 Medb Ruane, The War of Words Over Joyce‟s Literary Legacy, IRISH TIMES, June 6, 
2000, available at 2000 WLNR 3139405. 
37
 Shloss v. Sweeney, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1072 (N.D. Cal. 2007).  I served as counsel 
for Professor Shloss in this litigation so I want to emphasize that the views expressed 
here are mine alone.  
38
 CAROL LOEB SHLOSS, LUCIA JOYCE: TO DANCE IN THE WAKE (2003).  
39
 I do not ignore that the fact that Professor Shloss had pro bono counsel also helped turn 
the tables in her favor. But as will be seen, even with all of the advantages she had, the 
Joyce Estate still fought hard to stop her speech. 
40
 William S. Kowinski, A Promising Artist Waylaid by Crashing of Her Mind, S.F. 
CHRON., Dec. 21, 2003, at M3, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2003/12/21/RVGT73N8OC1.DTL. 
41
 Max, supra note 28, at 6.  
42
 See Hermione Lee, No She Said No, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2003, at 1 available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/28/books/no-she-said-no.html. 
43
 See Sean O‘Hagan, Private Dancer, THE GAURDIAN, Sunday May 16, 2004 available 
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and died in one in 1982.
44
 To research Lucia Joyce, Shloss traveled the world searching 
for documents about Lucia‘s life.45 Many documents about Lucia Joyce have been 
destroyed over the years, apparently by her family, out of shame regarding her 
condition.
46
 Shloss also sought evidence for her thesis that Lucia influenced and 
indirectly contributed to Finnegans Wake.
47
 
Stephen Joyce seems to have always considered his Aunt Lucia off-limits for 
scholarly inquiry. In 1988, Stephen Joyce destroyed many of Lucia‘s letters.48 When 
scholars were outraged by his actions, he responded ―What are people going to do to stop 
me?‖49 Similarly, in 1992, Stephen Joyce succeeded in removing documents regarding 
Lucia from the archives at the National Library of Ireland, even though he had no legal 
claim to these papers.
50
 
In addition to destroying documents, once it learned of Shloss‘s work on her 
book, the Joyce Estate attempted to stymie Shloss‘s investigation into Lucia‘s life. For 
instance, when Shloss traveled to the University of Buffalo in New York to consult the 
James Joyce papers in the Special Collections at the Lockwood Memorial Library,
51
 the 
library‘s director told her that he had been contacted by ―intermediaries‖ from the Joyce 
Estate, who discouraged him from giving Shloss access to the Library‘s Joyce 
materials.
52
 Shloss was allowed to see the documents, but told to keep a ―low profile.‖53 
The director allegedly was afraid that the Joyce Estate would sue the university if it found 
out that Shloss had used the Library‘s Joyce documents.54 While the university could not 
actually have been sued for giving a patron access to library materials, it does need 
copyright permission from the Joyce Estate any time it wants to make use of Joyce‘s 
work in exhibitions or publications. Accordingly, the Library director was reasonable in 
fearing that angering the Joyce Estate could negatively impact the Library‘s work. 
Stephen Joyce also wrote a number of letters to Shloss directly warning her not to 
use documents from any Joyce family members. In a March 31, 1996 letter, Joyce told 
Shloss that ―you do not have our approval/permission to ‗use‘ any letters or papers by or 
from Lucia. . . . [or] our authorization to use any letters from my grandfather to anybody 
which deal with her.‖55  
                                                                                                                                                 
at http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2004/may/16/biography.features. 
44
 See Kowinksi, supra note 40.  
45
 Shloss, 515 F. Supp. 2d at 1072. 
46
 See Kowinksi, supra note 40. 
47
 See Max, supra note 28, at 6. 
48
 Id. at 1. 
49
 Janna Malamud Smith, Where Does a Writer‟s Family Draw the Line, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 5, 1989, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1989/11/05/books/where-does-a-
writer-s-family-draw-the-line.html. 
50
 Max, supra note 28, at 1. 
51
 Declaration of Carol Loeb Shloss in Opposition to Defendants‘ Motion to Dismiss 
¶ 17, Case No. CV 06-3718 [Docket No. 33] (N.D. Cal. 2006). 
52
 Max, supra note 28, at 6. 
53
 Shloss Decl. ¶ 17. 
54
 Id. 
55
 Id. at ¶ 17, Ex. C (emphasis added). 
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Shloss pressed on notwithstanding Joyce‘s threatening letters, and in 2001, she 
signed a contract with the publishing house Farrar Straus & Giroux to publish her book.
56
 
When Stephen Joyce learned of the contract, he wrote Shloss and again warned her 
against the use of any Joyce family materials.
57
 In this letter he referred to the Estate‘s 
history of litigation against other authors, saying ―[o]ver the past few years we have 
proven that we are willing to take any necessary action to back and enforce what we 
legitimately believe in.‖58 Although copyright law does not protect privacy rights,59 Joyce 
justified his aggressive position by saying that he needed to ―safeguard whatever remains 
of the much abused and invaded Joyce family privacy.‖60  
Stephen Joyce also threatened Shloss‘s publisher directly. In a series of letters and 
phone calls, Joyce stated that he would not allow any use of Lucia-related material, that 
Shloss needed his permission to quote from letters written by Joyce family members or 
associates—which was explicitly denied, and that he had ―never lost a lawsuit.‖61 
Shloss‘s publisher supported its author and took the position that Shloss‘s use of the 
Lucia-related material was protected by the statutory right to fair use of copyrighted 
material, and thus permission from the Joyce Estate was not legally required.
62
 This 
elicited further threats from Stephen Joyce in yet more letters. He told Shloss‘s publisher 
to  ―take . . . very seriously‖ his earlier letters and repeatedly warned against use of any of 
the Lucia-related materials.
63
 He further warned Farrar Straus & Giroux that it ―should be 
aware of the fact that over the past decade the James Joyce Estate‘s ‗record‘, in legal 
terms, is crystal clear and we have proven on a number of occasions that we are prepared 
to put our money where our mouth is.‖64 When the publisher stopped responding to his 
letters, Joyce wrote again to say that ―[a]s I indicated in my previous letter, there are 
more ways than one to skin a cat!‖65  
Joyce did not stop there. A few months later he wrote again to Shloss‘s publisher 
to ―formally inform‖ it that ―Shloss and her publishers are NOT granted permission to 
use any quotations from anything‖ that Lucia Joyce ―ever wrote, drew or painted.‖66 He 
further stated that (according to him) ―fair use does not apply to letters, consequently no 
extracts from letters of any member of the Joyce family can be used in Ms. Shloss‘ book 
                                                 
56
 Shloss Decl. ¶ 25. 
57
 Max, supra note 28,at 6. 
58
 Id. at 2. 
59
 See Madoff, supra note 16, at 121, 125 (noting that ―copyright provides protection for 
a person‘s creative expression‖ while privacy laws ―protects against feelings of 
embarrassment‖).    
60
 Shloss Decl. ¶ 26, Ex. G. 
61
 Shloss Decl. ¶ 33, Ex. J; Decl. of Jonathan Galssi in Opposition to Defendants‘ Motion 
to Dismiss ¶ 2, Ex. 2, No. CV 06-3718 [Docket No. 35] (N.D. Cal. December 15, 2006). 
62
 Shloss, 515 F. Supp. 2d at 1073. 
63
 Decl. of Leon Friedman in Opposition to Defendants‘ Motion to Dismiss ¶ 2, Ex. 2, 
Shloss v. Sweeney, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1068, No. CV 06-3718 [Docket No. 34] (N.D. Cal. 
December 15, 2006). 
64
 Id. 
65
 Friedman Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. 3. 
66
 See, e.g., Lee, supra note 42.  
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and I, acting for both the Estate and Family, refuse to grant such permission.‖67 Joyce 
ended with an open threat: ―So be it. I am perfectly willing to play the ‗game‘ your way 
but there will be repercussions. This is not a threat but a statement of fact….‖68 
Shloss had strong fair use arguments for her scholarly use of quotations from 
books and letters for her Lucia Joyce book. Stephen Joyce‘s assertion, for example, that 
fair use does not apply to letters was obviously false.
69
 But she quite reasonably feared 
that if she used the materials to which she believed she had a right, she could be 
bankrupted by even a meritless lawsuit. She told her agent in 2003: ―It‘s not a matter of 
winning or not. The suit itself would ruin us.‖70 Nor did Shloss‘s publisher want to face a 
lawsuit, especially given that profit margins on non-fiction books such as Shloss‘s could 
be easily consumed in the cost of a lawsuit, whether won or lost.
71
 Thus, in the end a 
significant amount of Lucia-related material was cut from Shloss‘s manuscript.72 Shloss 
was greatly dismayed, and felt that the book she had spent over a dozen years writing was 
being gutted of important material. When her book was reviewed, reviewers criticized her 
for a lack of evidentiary support for otherwise interesting theses.
73
   
Shloss was dissatisfied with the form in which her work was published and she 
eventually found pro bono counsel.
74
 She then created a website on which was posted the 
excised material from her book.
75
 She sent the Joyce Estate the material that she planned 
to host on her website, and again asked it to agree that her use was fair and protected 
under copyright law.
76
 Again the Estate refused to agree, and threatened to sue under its 
copyrights.
77
 The Estate said that Shloss‘s proposed use of the Lucia-related materials 
                                                 
67
 Id. 
68
 Id. 
69
 17 U.S.C. § 107 (―The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of 
fair use‖). 
70
 Shloss Decl. ¶ 26, Ex. K. 
71
  See generally Joseph Galante and Greg Bensinger, Kindle‟s $9.99 Books May Shrink 
Publisher‟s Profits, July 9, 2009,  
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aWhjmdVFcC2Q (noting 
that publishers ordinarily expect to earn $0.26 per copy). Since the typical publisher 
expects to sell 5,000 copies, the expected profits per book are well below the costs of 
defending a copyright lawsuit which can be hundreds of thousands of dollars.  See THE 
VERMONT EDUCATION REPORT, Nov. 18,  2002, Vol. 2, No. 46 available at 
http://www.schoolreport.com/vbe/nlet/11_18_02.htm.  
72
  See Max, supra note 28, at 4.  
73
 See id.; see also Declaration of Carol Loeb Shloss in Opposition to Defendants‘ 
Motion to Dismiss, ¶¶ 47-48, Case No. CV 06-3718 (JW) (HRL) (N.D. Cal. 2006). 
74
 Shloss contacted Larry Lessig at Stanford Law School. After reviewing her situation, 
Lessig agreed that he and his Center for Internet and Society would represent Shloss. I 
served as the attorney with primary day-to-day responsibility for the case. Soon 
thereafter, Robert Spoo joined the case, first with the law firm of Doerner Saunders and 
then with Howard Rice. Mark Lemley and his former firm, Keker Van Nest, also joined 
the team shortly after the complaint was filed. 
75
 Carol Loeb Shloss, Lucia Joyce: Supplemental Material, http://www.lucia-the-authors-
cut.info/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2010).  
76
 See Max, supra note 28, at 7. 
77
 See id.   
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was an ―unwarranted infringement of the Estate‘s copyright.‖78 The Estate went on to 
―request in the strongest possible terms that [the Estate‘s] legal rights on this issue be 
respected.‖79  
Shloss filed a declaratory judgment action against the Joyce Estate asking a court 
to rule that she had the fair use right to use the material on her website. The case survived 
a motion to dismiss,
80
 and the Joyce Estate settled with Shloss on terms that allowed her 
to use the materials at issue.
81
 The Joyce Estate was also ordered to pay Shloss attorney‘s 
fees, because she was the prevailing party in the lawsuit.
82
 Shloss‘s fees ran into the 
hundreds of thousands of dollars.
83
 Even though she was eventually able to win a 
judgment requiring the Joyce Estate to pay her fees, if she had not had pro bono counsel, 
she never would have been able to front the costs of the fair use litigation on her own, 
and her fair use rights would have been effectively foreclosed. 
II. THE FAILURE OF FAIR USE AS A PRACTICALLY 
AVAILABLE RIGHT  
Professor Shloss‘s story perfectly illustrates the damage that can be caused by 
what Alfred Yen calls ―aggressive copyright claims.‖84 These claims are often made 
against authors producing highly transformative or critical works and essentially assert 
that copying any language constitutes infringement.
85
 Such overzealous assertion of 
copyrights in cases involving criticism or transformative work ultimately harms society 
because it results in the silencing of new ―original‖ expression.86 
                                                 
78
 Id.   
79
 Declaration of Grace Smith, Ex. 5, Case No. CV 06-3718 (JW) (HRL) (N.D. Cal. 
2006) (emphasis added). 
80
 Shloss, 515 F. Supp. 2d at 1082.  
81
 Bob Egelko, Professor Wins Fees From Joyce Estate, S.F. CHRON., Sep. 29, 2009, 
available at http://articles.sfgate.com/2009-09-29/bay-area/17204989_1_james-joyce-
stephen-joyce-copyright-law. 
82
 Id.; Cavanaugh, supra note 29. 
83
 See Egelko, supra note 81 (noting that Shloss was awarded $329,000 in legal fees and 
costs). 
84
 Yen, supra note 15, at 677 (―The practice of ignoring the First Amendment in 
copyright cases has…made possible the problematic assertion of what I call ‗aggressive 
copyright claims.‘  As the label implies, these claims aggressively test the boundaries of 
copyright by urging courts to adopt unconventional or novel readings of doctrine that 
would extend copyright well beyond its core of preventing individuals from reproducing 
the copyrighted works of others.‖). 
85
 See e.g. id. (―aggressive copyright claims are often made against defendants who have 
done more than simply ‗parrot‘ a copyrighted work.  These defendants have generally 
added meaningful work of their own, whether in the form of comment of criticism, 
significant reworking of the plaintiff‘s material, or new material unrelated to the 
copyrighted work.  At their most extreme, aggressive copyright claims assert that almost 
any borrowing from a copyrighted work constitutes actionable infringement.‖); Jason 
Mazzone, Copyfraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1026, 1052 (2006) (―When de minimis copying 
and fair use are routinely discouraged, a copyright notice comes to signal not merely that 
the work is protected, but that every reproduction is prohibited.‖). 
86
 See e.g., Yen, supra note 15, at 682 (―Enforcing copyright against those who add 
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Authors faced with aggressive copyright claims are left few options to defend 
themselves.
87
 The two main defenses available are fair use and the idea/expression 
dichotomy.
88
 The fair use defense is defined by statute and allows for the unapproved use 
of copyrighted material in limited situations.
89
 The idea/expression dichotomy protects 
the concept that a copyright does not grant an author exclusive rights to any idea, but 
instead merely to the particular expression that he or she created.
90
  These two doctrines 
together are sometimes thought to provide all necessary protection against copyright 
holders infringing on the First Amendment rights of authors.
91
 
In reality, however, these defenses are not sufficient to protect authors from 
aggressive copyright claims.
92
 In cases such as Carol Shloss‘s, the protection of a fair 
user‘s rights is often prohibitively expensive and insufficiently guaranteed under these 
two defenses because asserting them requires an infringement trial.
93
 Furthermore, the 
defenses have vague boundaries and rely on multipart judicial tests that make 
determining the likelihood of success difficult.
94
 Unfortunately, this means that 
                                                                                                                                                 
expression of their own to borrowed material means silencing newly created speech.  
These losses are much more serious than losses of borrowed speech because no 
equivalent existing speech takes the place of silenced new speech.‖); JuNelle Harris, 
Beyond Fair Use: Expanding Copyright Misuse to Protect Free Speech, 13 TEX. INTELL. 
PROP. L.J. 83, 85 (2004) (―These cases clearly also raise important First Amendment 
issues, as copyright is wielded as a sword rather than as a shield, to silence speakers who 
are engaged in criticism rather than in economic piracy…‖); Mazzone, supra note 85, at 
1030 (―In addition to enriching publishers who assert false copyright claims at the 
expense of legitimate users, copyfraud stifles valid forms of reproduction and creativity 
and undermines free speech.‖). 
87
 See Victoria Smith Ekstrand, Protecting the Public Policy Rationale of Copyright: 
Reconsidering Copyright Misuse, 11 COMM. L. & POL‘Y 565, 567-8 (2006) (―While the 
copyright statute offers users some defenses for those accused of infringement—namely 
the Fair Use Doctrine—the statute provides no definition of a copyright holder who 
abuses his rights and offers no restitution for a wrongly accused infringer.‖). 
88
 Harris, supra note 86, at 93 (―[T]he Supreme Court has held that free speech interests 
are adequately protected through the two major copyright-limiting doctrines: the 
idea/expression dichotomy and fair use.‖). 
89
 17 U.S.C. §107. 
90
 Harris, supra note 87, at 88 (―[T]he idea/expression dichotomy…holds that copyright 
in expressive matter does not protect underlying ideas or facts contained in a copyrighted 
work of authorship.‖). 
91
 Yen, supra note 15, at 676 (―According to conventional wisdom, copyright law already 
incorporates First Amendment values through the idea/expression dichotomy and the 
defense of fair use.‖); David S. Olson, First Amendment Interests and Copyright 
Accommodations, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1393 (2009). 
92
 See Harris, supra note 86, at 108 (―Thus, while the scope of statutory copyright 
protection has expanded, fair use has remained at best fixed, leaving it particularly ill 
suited to deal with technological change.‖). 
93
 Id. at 98 (―As an affirmative defense, whether a use is ‗fair‘ can be determined only 
within the context of infringement litigation, and the defendant bears the burden of proof.  
Thus…users with limited resources may be silenced by the mere threat of litigation long 
before fair use analysis is brought to bear on any First Amendment interests.‖). 
94
 Yen, supra note 15, at 679 (―Doctrinal limits on the reach of copyright exist, but those 
limits are frustratingly vague.‖). 
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oftentimes authors are effectively silenced by the threat of litigation regardless of the 
validity of the accuser‘s claims.95 
The Supreme Court recently has affirmed that copyright law is subject to First 
Amendment limitations.
96
 Indeed, the very purpose of the Copyright Act is to foster First 
Amendment values.
97
 As the Shloss v. Joyce case makes plain, ironically, certain types of 
work that the Copyright Act is designed to foster cannot be created (or cannot be created 
well) without the right to quote the copyrighted works of others. A classic example is a 
book review. The review cannot be as compelling or complete without the use of 
quotations from the work that is being reviewed. A paraphrase is simply not as 
convincing as a quotation. And, of course, if the book review is critical, then the author of 
the reviewed work likely will not be willing to give permission for the use of any 
quotations from the work.
98
 Likewise, documentaries, if they are to accurately reflect the 
world they are filming, will often contain bits and pieces of other people‘s copyrighted 
works.
99
 And again, critical analysis of a work cannot be done without liberal quotation 
from the work. In addition, artistic works that comment on other works or incorporate 
images, words, or expression from popular culture must make use of copyrighted 
works,
100
 especially given the current length of the copyright term. 
                                                 
95
 See e.g., Harris, supra note 86, at 98; Ekstrand, supra note 87, at 566 (―[T]he Chilling 
Effects study legitimizes the concern about the ever-growing population of…content 
owners who create a chilling effect on the reuse of their work in the marketplace.‖). 
96
 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. at 221 (rejecting the argument that ―copyrights [are] 
categorically immune from challenges under the First Amendment.‖). 
97
 Golan v. Gonzales, (10
th
 Cir. 2007).  See also Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558 
(observing that ―the Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of free 
expression,‖ and thus ―the monopoly created by copyright thus rewards the individual 
author in order to benefit the public.‖) (internal quotation marks omitted); Aiken, 422 
U.S. at 156 (―The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an 
‗author‘s creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic 
creativity for the general public good.‖); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (―The 
economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant [] copyrights is 
the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to 
advance public welfare through the talents of authors . . . in ‗. . . [the] useful Arts.‘‖); Fox 
Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (―The sole interest of the United States 
and the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by 
the public from the labors of authors.‖). 
98
 See, Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 
1997). 
99
 See LESSIG, supra note 6, AT 95-98 (describing the experience of Jon Else while 
filming his documentary about stage hands working on a production of Wagner‘s Ring 
Cycle.  A scene in Else‘s movie from back stage contained an indirect 4.5 second long 
shot of The Simpsons television show in the background.  Fox demanded a $10,000 
royalty for use of the clip in the movie.  Else was forced to remove the clip digitally, 
detracting from the ―flavor of what was special about the scene‖).  
100
 Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated that artistic expression is deserving of 
substantial First Amendment protection.  See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 
U.S. 781, 790 (1989) (―Music is one of the oldest forms of human expression. From 
Plato‘s discourse in the Republic to the totalitarian state in our own times, rulers have 
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It is for these reasons that courts first recognized an equitable right to fair use,
101
 
which was later codified by Congress.
102
 Fair use gives content creators the right to use 
the copyrighted work of others ―for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, 
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research . . . .‖103 
If a content creator wants to use a copyrighted work for one of the purposes allowed by 
Section 107, then the content creator can do so without asking permission or even 
informing the copyright owner of the use. This all sounds well and good for the efficient 
allowance of socially-desirable uses of copyrighted works, but the devil is in the details. 
As has been extensively discussed in the literature, the four-part test set out in Section 
107 is famously murky,
104
 and subsequent case law has not helped greatly to clarify the 
question.
105
  
                                                                                                                                                 
known [music‘s] capacity to appeal to the intellect and to the emotions, and have 
censored musical compositions to serve the needs of the state. . . . The Constitution 
prohibits any like attempts in our own legal order. Music, as a form of expression and 
communication, is protected under the First Amendment.‖); Schad v. Borough of Mount 
Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981) (―Entertainment, as well as political and ideological 
speech, is protected; motion pictures, programs broadcast by radio and television, and 
live entertainment, such as musical and dramatic works, fall within the First Amendment 
guarantee.‖); Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 119-120 (1973) (―[P]ictures, films, 
paintings, drawings, and engravings . . . have First Amendment protection . . . .‖). 
101
 See, e.g., Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F.Cas. 342 (C.C.Mass. 1841); Sony Corp. of America v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. 
Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 
569 (1994). 
102
 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
103
 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
104
 See, e.g., Matthew D. Bunker, Transforming the News: Copyright and Fair Use in 
News-Related Contexts, 52 J. Copyright Soc‘y U.S.A. 309 (2005) (―[I]t seems fair to say 
that fair use jurisprudence in the news context is something of a conceptual 
muddle…This state of affairs is unfortunate, of course, because of the tremendous 
uncertainty faced by putative fair users.‖); Andrew Inesi, Images of Public Places: 
Extending the Copyright Exemption for Pictorial Representations of Architectural Works 
to Other Copyrighted Works, 13 J. Intell. Prop. L. 61, 76 (2005) (―The fact-intensive 
nature of the fair use analysis, combined with considerable argument and confusion over 
how the test should be applied, makes it difficult to predict the applicability of fair use in 
all but the most obvious cases.‖); Dana Beldiman, Fundamental Rights, Author‟s Right 
and Copyright—Commonalities or Divergences?, 29 Colum. J.L. & Arts 39, 58 (2005) 
(―Because of the vagueness and subjectivity of the fair use test neither the creators 
themselves nor their legal advisors are in a position to predict whether a given use is 
fair.‖); Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture 187 (2004) (―[F]air use in America simply means 
the right to hire a lawyer....‖). 
105
 See, e.g., Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (1939) (―the issue of fair 
use…is the most troublesome in the whole law of copyright…‖); Marvin Worth 
Productions v. Superior Films Corp., 319 F.Supp. 1269, 1273 (1970) (―[T]he defendants‘ 
major position is anchored on the theory of fair use.  This doctrine…judges and 
commentators alike have found to be exceptionally elusive even for the law…‖); Time, 
Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F.Supp. 130, 144 (1968) (―The doctrine is entirely 
equitable and is so flexible as virtually to defy definition.‖). 
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This puts would-be fair users in an untenable situation. The only way for them to 
know for sure that their use of copyrighted material is fair is to get a court declaration.  
The content creator may get a court ruling either by suing for a declaratory judgment, if 
she has the requisite actual conflict sufficient to meet the declaratory judgment 
standard,
106
 or by using the copyrighted work, getting sued, and having the court 
determine fair use at that time. Both of these options have obvious drawbacks. In the 
second case, if the use of each quotation from the copyrighted work is not deemed to be 
fair, then the user may be liable for copyright damages,
107
 and perhaps attorneys‘ fees.108 
While a user who meets the requirements for bringing a declaratory judgment action may 
do so and avoid the possibility of damages, the action itself is likely to be quite 
expensive, and can be made even more so if the copyright holder contests that the 
jurisdictional requirement for a declaratory judgment action has been met, as did the 
Joyce Estate in Shloss v. Joyce.
109
  The user of the copyrighted work will have to hire 
attorneys, file a complaint, withstand any jurisdictional challenge, deal with any 
discovery the court allows, and then file papers parsing each use of a copyrighted work, 
and the reasons the use qualifies as fair.  Such cases can easily reach six figures in 
attorneys‘ fees on each side.110 When one adds to the legal fees the potential for statutory 
damages being assessed against the would-be fair user if her use is adjudged outside fair 
use, the deterrence to fair use becomes even more substantial. Statutory damages range 
from $750 to $30,000 per work infringed,
111
 and can be increased to $150,000 per work 
infringed if a court finds that the defendant‘s infringement was willful.112 This means that 
even if the market effect on the copyright owner‘s work is zero, anyone adjudged to have 
infringed the work may still be assessed with thousands of dollars of penalties per work 
infringed.
113
  
                                                 
106
 See, e.g., Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entertainment, Inc., 342 F.3d 191 
(3rd Cir. 2003); Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195 (N.D. Cal. 
2004); Micro Star v. Formgen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107 (Cal. 1998); Clean Flicks of Colorado, 
LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F.Supp.2d 1236 (D.Colo. 2006). 
107
 17 U.S.C. § 504. 
108
 17 U.S.C. § 505. 
109
 Plaintiff‘s Motion in Opposition of Defendant‘s Motion to Dismiss,16-18, Case No. 
CV 06-3718 [Docket No. 32] (N.D. Cal. 2006)   
110
 See, e.g., Kevin M. Lemley, I‟ll Make Him an Offer He Can‟t Refuse: A Proposed 
Model for Alternative Dispute Resolution in Intellectual Property Disputes, 37 Akron L. 
Rev. 287, 311 (2004) (―Intellectual property litigation typically spans several years with 
total costs commonly exceeding hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars.  A 
2001 survey…calculated the average cost through trial of typical patent disputes…at 
$1,499,000; $699,000 for similar trade secret disputes; $502,000 for trademark disputes; 
and $400,000 for copyright disputes.‖). 
111
 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2006). 
112
 Id. § 504(c)(2). 
113
 See, e.g., Special Verdict Form at 17–20, Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, No. 
06-CV-1497 (MJD/RLE), 2009 WL 1717117 (D. Minn. June 18, 2009) (finding 
defendant who shared music files using peer-to-peer software liable for willful copyright 
infringement and awarding $80,000 per song); Jury Verdict Form at 2–8, Sony BMG 
Music Entm‘t v. Tenenbaum, Nos. 03-CV-11661-NG, 07-CV-11446-NG, 2009 WL 
2390631 (D. Mass. June 15, 2009) (finding defendant liable for $22,500 per act of willful 
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As a result, aggressive copyright holders can hold the threat of litigation over the 
heads of potential users to get them to desist from using copyrighted material, or to make 
them use it only in ways acceptable to the copyright holder. While it is true that to 
actually litigate a fair use dispute is costly for both sides, it is nearly costless for the 
copyright holder to threaten suit, or simply to leave the potential user in fear of suit. This 
tactic was precisely the one used by the Joyce Estate against Shloss and many other 
scholars, and has been used by numerous other copyright holders against would-be users 
of their copyrighted works.
114
 Moreover, even if the user sues the copyright holder to 
have the right to fair use judicially determined, the copyright holder can at that point 
simply covenant not to sue the user and then walk away from the entire suit with very 
little cost to itself.
115
  
Thus, preventing fair use of copyrighted work can be done quite easily and often 
nearly costlessly by a determined copyright holder. This is especially the case when the 
potential user is an academic, a typical documentary maker, or any other content creator 
who is not wealthy enough to absorb the cost of an infringement litigation. In fact, even 
parties with deep pockets can be intimidated from pursuing fair use. For a typical book 
publisher, film distributor, music distributor, or the like, the hassle and cost of defending 
a copyright litigation based on fair use can turn a profitable project into an unprofitable 
one, or at least into one that is not worth the trouble.
116
 Moreover, if using numerous 
quotations based on fair use would likely draw an infringement suit, then a corporate 
publisher is arguably obligated by its profit-making duty to shareholders not to make the 
fair use and risk the suit.
117
  
                                                                                                                                                 
infringement for sharing music files using peer-to-peer technology); Capitol Records Inc. 
v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1213 (D. Minn. 2008) (ordering new trial in peer-to-
peer file sharing case after jury found defendant liable for statutory damages in the 
amount of $9,250 per each act of infringement without a showing of actual distribution of 
infringing works). 
114
 See supra, notes 16 - 27, and accompanying text. 
115
 This tactic was used by the Joyce Estate in Shloss v. Sweeney, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1068 
(N.D. Cal. 2007).  The Estate first issued a covenant not to sue that covered some, but not 
all, of Shloss‘s website.  See Plaintiff‘s Motion in Opposition of Defendant‘s Motion to 
Dismiss,18, Case No. CV 06-3718 [Docket No. 32] (N.D. Cal. 2006).  Then the Estate 
moved to have Shloss‘s case dismissed as not meeting the requirements for a declaratory 
judgment as to the portion of the website not covered by the covenant.  Id.  When the 
court denied the Joyce Estate‘s motion, after considerable effort and expense for both 
sides in terms of briefing and arguing the motion, the Estate then promptly covenanted 
not to sue Shloss and the case was dismissed. Court Order, Case No. CV 06-3718 
[Docket No. 72] (N.D. Cal. 2007).  
116
 This is, in fact, what happened in Shloss v. Sweeney. Once the Joyce Estate contacted 
Shloss‘s publisher and threatened to enforce its legal rights if Shloss‘s book was 
published, the publisher then cut numerous quotations from the book.  See Plaintiff‘s 
Motion in Opposition of Defendant‘s Motion to Dismiss,1, Case No. CV 06-3718 
[Docket No. 32] (N.D. Cal. 2006).   
117
 Kent Greenfield, Using Behavioral Economics to Show the Power and Efficiency of 
Corporate Law as Regulatory Tool, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581, 605 (―Since the early-
twentieth century case of Dodge v. Ford, corporations have been deemed to have an 
‗unyielding‘ duty to look after the interests of the shareholders, which has been translated 
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There is a second way in which copyright owners can misuse their copyrights, and 
this type of misuse is perhaps even more damaging to First Amendment interests. In 
many cases an author would like to use more of a copyrighted work than is allowed by 
fair use. For instance, fair use allows a biographer to use excerpts from letters written by 
the subject of the biography, but the biographer might want to include full versions of 
certain letters in his book. Likewise, a filmmaker might want to include music or video 
clips in his film that exceed the limits of fair use. In these cases the subsequent creator 
must seek a license from the copyright owner(s). In the normal case, a license is 
negotiated for a fee and the subsequent user includes the portions of the copyrighted work 
for which she has bargained. But in some cases copyright holders use the negotiations 
over licensing their work to exert control over others‘ speech. These copyright holders 
demand that, in exchange for a license to use the copyrighted work, certain topics not be 
discussed, or may only be discussed in a favorable way (or in a negative way, depending 
on the axe the copyright owner has to grind). Other copyright holders demand that in 
exchange for a copyright license the author agree not to research, investigate, or write 
about certain things or to pursue certain areas of inquiry. We saw that the Joyce Estate 
engaged in exactly this sort of behavior in its copyright license to Brenda Maddox, 
pursuant to which she was forced to literally rip out a section of her printed books.
118
 Not 
only is this damaging to the scholars who take restrictive licenses, it is also damaging to 
the public, who now gets only part of the story and may be misled into believing that 
there is no more to be known, when the author is actually sitting on relevant facts and 
analysis that cannot be distributed due to the copyright license. This sort of conditional 
licensing is currently allowed, but under my proposal in Part V it would become 
presumptive misuse. 
Developments in copyright law in the last decade such as the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (―DMCA‖), have exacerbated the situation by providing copyright holders 
with new tools for blocking the use of their works.
119
 The DMCA makes it illegal to 
circumvent security or encryption technology on digital works. The DMCA was intended 
to protect things like music and movies from being copied and distributed. Unfortunately, 
however, copyright holders can use the DMCA to deter fair use because even if copying a 
particular part of a digital work is plainly fair, if the work is encrypted or protected by 
security measures, then altering those measures to make the fair use is a separate 
violation for which would-be fair users can be sued.  
                                                                                                                                                 
into a duty to maximize profits.‖); Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder 
Analysis of Corporate Illegality (With Notes on How Corporate Law Could Reinforce 
International Law Norms), 87 VA. L. REV. 1279, 1282 (2001) (―[S]ome of the most 
prominent scholars in corporate law…have written that corporations should, with only 
some small exceptions, seek to maximize profits even when they must break the law to 
do so.‖). 
118
 See supra notes 30 - 35 and accompanying text. 
119
 See Dan L. Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1096 (2003) 
(―Paracopyright as conferred by the DMCA constitutes a separate set of rights, quite 
distinct from any copyright in the underlying content.  These new rights are expansive 
and unprecedented.  They allow control of uncopyrighted materials, and confer upon 
content owners a new exclusive right to control not only access to technologically 
protected works, but also ancillary technologies related to content protection.‖). 
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In stark contrast to the additional tools that copyright holders have in digital 
security technology and the DMCA, would-be fair users are left with a fair use defense 
that is fixed in its codified form and lacks the flexibility of common law to adapt to new 
challenges in copyright law.
120
 Taken together, this leads to an imbalance between 
copyright protection and protection of the public domain.
121
 Thus, a need exists to make 
practically available the fair use and idea/expression dichotomy protections for new 
authors, especially in the case of critical works.
122
 I propose that a defense of copyright 
misuse is the way to make these protections practically available, but before discussing 
copyright misuse, I briefly survey other proposals that have been made to better enable 
the protections granted by fair use. 
III. SURVEY OF PREVIOUS PROPOSALS TO ENABLE FAIR 
USE RIGHTS 
Many commentators have noted these problems with the imbalance between 
protecting copyright holders and allowing legal, socially-valuable fair use. A number of 
reform proposals have been made to try to remedy this problem. As I have said earlier, 
my proposal in this article is not to change the contours of fair use, but rather to increase 
the leverage of would-be fair users, so that they are not chilled from making their fair use. 
Before discussing my proposal, however, a survey of recent proposals to remedy the 
problem I seek to address is in order. 
The reform proposals seeking to address the problem of the practical 
ineffectiveness of fair use can be broadly grouped into the following three categories: 
proposals to decrease the costs of fair use determinations; proposals to decrease the 
penalties of being adjudged an infringer notwithstanding a good-faith belief that the use 
was fair; and proposals to modify copyright law or the fair use test itself so as to make 
fair use determinations more predictable or otherwise better serve the policy goals 
underlying copyright and fair use.
123
  
A number of commentators have suggested that one way to make fair use rights 
more practically available is to decrease the cost of obtaining a fair use decision. As 
                                                 
120
 Harris, supra note 86 at 108. 
121
 Jason Mazzone, Copyfraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1026, 1029 (2006) (―Copyright law 
suffers from a basic defect: The law‘s strong protections for copyrights are not balanced 
by explicit protections for the public domain.‖). 
122
 See Richard Posner, Fair Use and Misuse, Larry Lessig‘s Blog, at 
http://www.lessig.org/blog/archives/002119.shtml (last visited August 20, 2007) (―What 
to do about such abuses of copyright?  One possibility…is to deem copyright 
overclaiming a form of copyright misuse, which could result in forfeiture of the 
copyright.‖). 
123
 My division of reform proposals into four categories is quite similar to the division 
made by Michael Carroll. See Michael w. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087 
(2007) (―There are four options for overcoming the problems caused by fair use 
uncertainty: (1) reduce the costs of obtaining a fair use determination ex ante under the 
current legal standard; (2) reduce the ex post penalties for misjudging fair use in good 
faith; (3) sharpen the fuzzy edges of the doctrine by establishing clearly delineated safe 
harbors or by making the entire doctrine more rule-like; or (4) implement a combination 
of these measures.‖). 
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discussed above, with average copyright suits costing hundreds of thousands of dollars
124
 
and fair use determinations being subject to high degrees of uncertainty, it is not practical 
for many would-be fair users to exercise their fair use rights.
125
 This uncertainty and 
costliness has led a number of commentators to suggest ways to make the fair use 
determination more cost effectively.  
A popular recent suggestion for decreasing the costs of fair use determinations is 
to allow an administrative body to make fair use determinations rather than requiring a 
full litigation of copyright infringement and fair use. David Nimmer was one of the first 
to make this suggestion.
126
 He proposed creating administrative tribunals to make fair use 
determinations in a cost-effective manner.
127
  
Michael Carroll has proposed a variant of this.
128
 Carroll‘s proposal uses as 
models the Internal Revenue Service‘s practice of issuing private letter rulings regarding 
the tax consequences of certain practices and the Securities and Exchange Commission‘s 
practice of issuing ―no action‖ letters that exempt certain securities practices from 
enforcement.
129
 Carroll suggests that these practices should inform our approach to fair 
use and provide the model for how to make cost-effective fair use decisions.
130
 Carroll 
suggests creating a ―Fair Use Board‖ in the Copyright Office that ―would have the power 
to declare a proposed use of another‘s copyrighted work to be a fair use.‖131 The fair use 
determination would be only as to the specific use by the specific petitioner.
132
 If the 
Board determined the use to be fair, then the petitioner would be immune from copyright 
liability.
133
 The copyright owner would receive notice and have an opportunity to 
participate in the Board‘s adjudicatory process, and the Board‘s rulings could be appealed 
within the Copyright Office and ultimately to the federal courts of appeals.
134
  
David Fagundes has proposed another variant of the administrative determination 
of fair use.
135
 Fagundes also proposes creating a board within the Copyright Office to 
make fair use determinations.
136
 Recognizing that there are both easy and hard cases for 
fair use, Fagundes proposes that the board would issue one of three findings after 
reviewing the parties‘ submissions: ―probably infringing, probably not infringing, or no 
opinion.‖137 Moreover, the board‘s findings would give ―strong presumption[s]‖ in the 
                                                 
124
 See Kevin M. Lemley, supra note 110. 
125
 See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text. 
126
 David Nimmer, A Modest Proposal to Streamline Fair Use Determinations, 24 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 11 (2006). 
127
 Id. 
128
 Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087 (2007). 
129
 Id. at 1090-91.  
130
 Id. at 1128-29, 1138 
131
 Id. at 1087.  
132
 See id. at 1125-27.   
133
 Id. at 1126.   
134
 Id. at 1126-1128 
135
 David Fagundes, Crystals in the Public Domain, 50 B.C. L. REV. 139 (2009). 
136
 Id. at 183.   
137
 Id. at 184.   
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direction of the board‘s finding, but would not preclude litigation of the issue.138 
Fagundes suggests this approach so that easy cases of fair use can be quickly determined 
while hard cases of fair use will be left directly to litigation.
139
 
Finally, two scholars have suggested that regulators might promulgate rules on 
fair use, as well as deciding fair use cases. Jason Mazzone has suggested two ways in 
which an administrative agency could administer fair use.
140
 First, he suggests that an 
agency be assigned responsibility for ―generating regulations that determine what 
constitutes fair use in specific contexts,‖141 and what conduct by copyright owners that 
deters fair use is out of bounds.
142
 Mazzone further suggests that in addition to issuing 
fair use regulations, an agency can adjudicate whether specific uses are fair,
143
 much like 
the proposals of Carroll and Fagundes, discussed above. Ben Deeporter has a similar 
proposal by which an administrative agency would issue guidelines that set ―explicit 
understanding[s] of new technology‖ and ―set default positions‖ regarding ―expectations 
of free use of new technologies.‖144 
A second area of proposed reform is in the area of decreasing the penalties for 
attempting fair use but being adjudged an infringer would encourage more fair use. Many 
would-be fair users would proceed with their proposed uses of copyrighted materials but 
for the penalties for being adjudged a copyright infringer. The Copyright Act provides 
that a copyright owner may, without any showing of actual damages, collect statutory 
damages of $750 to $30,000 per work infringed,
145
 with possible enhancement up to 
$150,000.
146
 Accordingly, various reform proposals have been suggested to reign in or 
eliminate statutory damages in cases in which fair use is asserted in good faith.
147
 
A third set of proposals have been made that take on fair use directly. Many 
commentators have suggested ways to make fair use less murky, so that parties could 
better predict whether uses are fair ex ante.
148
 Others have suggested reforms to fair use 
aimed at better serving the underlying policies of copyright law.
149
  
                                                 
138
 Id.   
139
 Id.  
140
 Jason Mazzone, Administering Fair Use, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 395 (2009). 
141
 Id. at 396.   
142
 Id.  
143
 Id. at 435-36.  
144
 Ben Depoorter, Technology and Uncertainty: The Shaping Effect on Copyright Law, 
157 U. PA. L. REV. 1831 (2009). 
145
 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2006). 
146
 Id. § 504(c)(2). 
147
 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Should a Licensing Market Require Licensing?, 70 LAW 
AND CONTEMP. PROB. 185, 200 (2007); Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 8 at 501; 
Thomas F. Cotter, Fair Use and Copyright Overenforcement, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1271, 
1300 (2008). 
148
 See, e.g., William F. Patry & Richard A. Posner, Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the 
Wake of Eldred, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1639, 1645 (2004) (proposing the creation of judge-
made safe harbors for fair use); Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin Goldman, Fair Use 
Harbors, 93 VA. L. REV. 1483 (2007) (proposing that Congress enact a number of non-
exclusive fair use safe harbors); Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to 
Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1525 (2004) (suggesting the use of pattern analysis to 
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IV. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF COPYRIGHT 
MISUSE 
Notwithstanding the numerous meritorious proposals to reform copyright law and 
fair use, the problem remains that the fair use rights that are already granted by law under 
the statute are not practically available to many would-be fair users. The companion 
problem of copyright holders tying copyright licenses to the requirement that the 
subsequent authors grant the copyright owners editorial control also remains. But a 
potential solution is available that can make fair use rights more practically available and 
that can discourage copyright holders from controlling the speech of others through 
aggressive copyright licensing practices. The solution lies in the equitable defense of 
copyright misuse, which has unique characteristics that make it well suited to protect 
                                                                                                                                                 
both unify the application of fair use and make it more predictable while preserving a 
robust fair use zone); Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2537, 2541-43 (2009) (arguing that by analyzing fair use cases in light of cases 
previously decided in the same ―policy-relevant cluster‖ makes fair use determinations 
more predictable); Maureen McCrann, A Modest Proposal: Granting Presumptive Fair 
Use Protection For Musical Parodies, 14 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 96, 124 (2009) 
(urging ―an affirmative presumption of fair use protection should be granted to musical 
re-writes.‖). 
149
 See, e.g., William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. 
REV. 1659, 1744-95 (1988) (proposing an ―utopian‖ approach to fair use designed to 
facilitate human flourishing through deliberately considering whether particular fair use 
decisions would increase people‘s access to, and ability to engage in, creative work); 
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L. REV. 975, 
998-99 (2002) (proposing that in deciding fair use cases, courts determine whether there 
is a meaningful likelihood of harm to the copyrighted work‘s market value, whether the 
proposed use will reduce the copyright owner‘s revenues and the output of creative 
works; and whether, having considered all of this, ―society would be better or worse off‖ 
allowing the use.); Michael J. Madison, Rewriting Fair Use and the Future of Copyright 
Reform, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 391 (2005) (arguing that ―the case for fair use is 
strongest when the defendant can persuasively argue that the value of her activity to 
society clearly outweighs even stipulated loss to the copyright owner[,]‖ and thus 
proposing that the Copyright Act be amended to state, ―Exclusive rights in copyright 
shall not extend to any use of a copyrighted work that society regularly values in itself.‖); 
Christina Bohannan, Copyright Harm, Foreseeability, and Fair Use, 85 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 969, 1028 (2007) (proposing that fair use should focus on whether there is harm to 
the original work‘s market, and proposing that courts should shift the burden of proof for 
the market harm factor); Joseph P. Liu, Two-Factor Fair Use?, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 
571 (2008) (urging conversion of fair use from a four-factor test to a two-factor balancing 
of (1) the purpose and character of the use against (2) the impact of the use on the 
market); Matthew Sag, God In The Machine: A New Structural Analysis of Copyright's 
Fair Use Doctrine, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 381 (2005) (suggesting that in 
deciding fair use cases judges forgo cost-benefit analysis and restrict their analysis to 
―principles derived from copyright law‖); Robert Kasunic, Is That All There Is? 
Reflections on the Nature of the Second Fair Use Factor, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 529 
(2008) (proposing reinvigoration of second factor); Christina Bohannan, Copyright 
Harm, Foreseeability, and Fair Use, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 969, 1028 (2007) (proposing 
that in fair use determinations courts should put the burden of proving market harm on 
the copyright holder and should only consider harm to the original use‘s market). 
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against uses of copyright that impinge on speech interests. To serve this function, 
however, copyright misuse must be decoupled from its traditional basis in antitrust law 
and instead be firmly grounded in First Amendment speech principles.  
Copyright misuse is at something of a crossroads right now. It grew out of its 
analog in patent misuse, and like patent misuse, copyright misuse has traditionally been 
used to address antitrust concerns—generally in a shorthanded fashion that does not 
involve all of the requirements of antitrust analysis. As this section of the Article shows, 
numerous commentators have made telling critiques of the shorthand version of antitrust 
analysis that courts have engaged in when deciding misuse defenses. These critiques have 
been fairly persuasive. This section of the Article also shows that there also has been a 
shift in economic thinking in antitrust cases such that the Supreme Court has said it is 
inappropriate to find anticompetitive behavior simply from an instance of a patent or 
copyright owner tying sales of its patented or copyrighted goods to requirements to also 
buy other goods.
150
 Thus, a defense of misuse based in antitrust policies may be 
inevitably on the decline. I argue, however, that while this fate may be appropriate for 
patent misuse, copyright misuse should not wither away, but instead should be refocused 
in a policy of First Amendment speech interests so that it can provide practical 
protections for speech and fair use interests that are provided by law but are often 
practically unavailable due to the unequal bargaining positions between copyright holders 
and those who would reuse portions of copyrighted works. Specifically, copyright misuse 
is unique as a defense because it focuses on the actions of the copyright holder, while 
other copyright defenses focus squarely on the actions of the allegedly infringing 
author.
151
 In addition, a defendant can raise the equitable defense of misuse based on a 
copyright owner‘s misuse of its copyright as against any person, not just the defendant.152 
These two qualities of the existing misuse defense, when combined with the First 
Amendment focus advocated by this Article, would provide substantial incentive for 
copyright holders to avoid any instances of misuse,
 153
 and would encourage new authors 
                                                 
150
 Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006). 
151
 See e.g., Note: Clarifying the Copyright Misuse Defense: The Role of Antitrust 
Standards and First Amendment Values, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1289, 1306 (1991) (―Unlike 
misuse doctrine, however, the fair use inquiry directs courts‘ attention to the social value 
of the defendant‘s conduct rather than the social harm caused by plaintiff‘s use of its 
copyright.‖); Kathryn Judge, Rethinking Copyright Misuse, 57 STAN. L. REV. 901, 915 
(2004) (―Copyright misuse is one of the only copyright-limiting doctrines that arises from 
actions taken by the copyright holder.‖); JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 179-84 
(2001) (advocating a return to a copyright framework that is comprehensible to ordinary 
consumers). 
152
 Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 979 (4th Cir. 1990) (―the defense of 
copyright misuse is available even if the defendants themselves have not been injured by 
the misuse‖). 
153
 Kathryn Judge, Rethinking Copyright Misuse, 57 STAN. L. REV. 901, 932-33 (2004) 
(―Cease-and-desist letters can be a legitimate means for copyright holders to prevent 
ongoing copyright infringement.  If a copyright holder uses such letters for this purpose 
by sending letters only to parties he reasonably believes are engaged in infringement and 
the letters accurately state the copyright holder‘s rights and the potential ramifications for 
infringement, he will likely be engaged in a lawful exercise of his rights.  As such, he 
should not be prevented from seeking relief, including injunctive relief, from the courts.  
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to create new critical or transformative speech that they have the legal right to make 
under fair use and the First Amendment. 
I explain in this part of the Article the evolution of copyright misuse and the 
critiques of antitrust-based misuse. In Part V, I lay out the case for shifting the policy 
basis for the copyright misuse defense firmly to First Amendment principles. 
A. Copyright Misuse’s Growth Out of Antitrust-Based 
Patent Misuse 
The doctrine of copyright misuse is an equitable defense similar to the common 
law doctrine of unclean hands.
154
 It is based on the notion that courts should deny any 
relief to a plaintiff if he has come to the court while engaging in improper behavior 
himself. Correspondingly, a finding of copyright misuse acts to bar the plaintiff from 
recovering any damages or injunctive relief for so long as the misuse continues.
155
 It is 
important to note that a plaintiff can cure his inequitable behavior and return to court to 
seek relief against an alleged infringer.
156
 
Copyright misuse‘s roots lie in the analogous doctrine of patent misuse. In 
Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., the Supreme Court first recognized patent misuse 
in a case involving tying arrangements.
157
 Tying is the practice of making a sale or 
license of a product contingent on the purchase of some other good. In Morton Salt, 
plaintiff licensed a patented machine for depositing salt tablets into cans and required its 
licensees to also purchase its salt tablets, which were not covered under the scope of the 
patent.
158
  The Court found that this practice was an impermissible attempt to expand the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Without a vibrant doctrine of copyright misuse, however, a copyright holder has no 
incentive not to abuse this lawful tool.  He could send such letters to anyone who 
criticizes his product, and he could exaggerate or even lie about the potential 
repercussions.‖). 
154
 See e.g., Note: Clarifying the Copyright Misuse Defense: The Role of Antitrust 
Standards and First Amendment Values, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1289, 1295 (1991) 
(―[C]ourts generally have viewed misuse doctrine as deriving from the equitable principle 
of unclean hands.‖); Brett M. Frischmann & Daniel Moylan, The Evolving Common Law 
Doctrine of Copyright Misuse: A Unified Theory and its Application to Software, 15 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 865, 867 (2000) (―Intellectual property misuse is a common law 
defense to infringement that derives from the equitable doctrine of ‗unclean hands.‘‖). 
155
 John T. Cross & Peter K. Yu, Competition Law and Copyright Misuse, 56 DRAKE L. 
REV. 427, 458-59 (2008) (―Rather than criminal penalties or treble damages under U.S. 
antitrust law, the sole penalty for copyright misuse is the inability to sue for infringement.  
That penalty exists only so long as the misuse continues…The doctrine of ―unclean 
hands‖ is a traditional defense available in actions in equity.  It applies when the party 
bringing suit has engaged in certain questionable conduct in connection with the action 
and when the conduct is sufficiently egregious to warrant denying relief.‖). 
156
 Jennifer R. Knight, Comment, Copyright Misuse v. Freedom of Contract: And the 
Winner is..., 73 TENN. L. REV. 237, 261 (2006); see also Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. 
Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 979, n.22 (4th Cir. 1990) (―This holding, of course, is not an 
invalidation of Lasercomb‘s copyright. Lasercomb is free to bring a suit for infringement 
once it has purged itself of the misuse.‖). 
157
 Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942). 
158
 Id. at 490. 
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reach of the patent.
 159
 The Court held that Morton Salt‘s misuse of its patent meant that 
plaintiff could not pursue its patent infringement suit against the defendant, who was a 
competitor of Morton Salt in manufacturing and selling salt-injecting equipment as well 
as unpatented salt tablets.
160
 Thus we see that the sanction of a finding of misuse can be 
severe. Once the Court determined that Morton‘s conduct with its patent was 
inappropriate (the effort to tie the license to other purchases with respect to at least some 
licensees), the Court denied Morton Salt any ability to pursue a patent claim against the 
defendant. This was the outcome even though the amendment that had no contractual 
relationship with Morton and was allegedly manufacturing and selling a directly 
infringing machine.
161
 While the general rule for patent misuse is that a patent owner can 
assert its patents again once it has cured the misuse,
162
 the Court in Morton Salt did not 
indicate openness to any assertion of the patent right in the future.
163
 Thus, Morton Salt‘s 
bad behavior with its patent vis a vis some parties ultimately prevented Morton Salt from 
enforcing that patent against anyone. 
Since Morton Salt, the doctrine of patent misuse has been further developed by 
the courts.
164
 While the doctrine relies greatly on antitrust law, courts have taken a looser, 
more shorthand approach to analyzing potentially anticompetitive conduct under patent 
misuse cases than when engaging formally in antitrust decisionmaking.
165
 For instance, 
the burden of proof for defendants invoking misuse is different than for a plaintiff in an 
antirust case. Patent misuse seems to require neither the showing of dominant market 
position nor direct harm to the defendant that is required in tying cases under antitrust 
law.
166
 Second, as an equitable defense, misuse simply bars recovery, but does not entitle 
                                                 
159
 Id. at 491. Note that by determining that Morton Salt‘s patent was unenforceable due 
to patent misuse, the Court decided the issue of anticompetitive conduct without 
requiring Morton Salt‘s competitor to prove the traditional elements of an antitrust tying 
claim: market power, market foreclosure, or injury to competition. For further discussion 
of this, see James B. Kobak, Jr., The Misuse Defense and Intellectual Property Litigation, 
1 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 2, 7 (1995). 
160
 Id. at 490-91. 
161
 Id. at 494. 
162
 See B. Braun Medical Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, 124 F.3d 1419, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 
1997) (sanction for patent misuse is that the patent is rendered unenforceable until such 
time as the misuse has been cured). 
163
 Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 494 (1942). 
164
 Brett M. Frischmann & Daniel Moylan, The Evolving Common Law Doctrine of 
Copyright Misuse: A Unified Theory and its Application to Software, 15 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 865, 868 (2000) (―Today, patent misuse is a well-established doctrine where 
courts generally apply antitrust principles to determine whether a patentee‘s use is 
misuse.‖). 
165
 Cross & Yu, supra note 155, at 457 (―On the surface, Lasercomb looks much like an 
antitrust case.  When one digs deeper, however, there are several important differences 
between the doctrine of copyright misuse and the antitrust law doctrines discussed 
earlier.‖). 
166
 Eastman Kodak v. Image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 462 (1992). See also, Ekstrand, 
supra note 73, at 571 (―Antitrust law requires the demonstration of anticompetitive 
practice by those with dominant market position.  Those patentees who misuse their grant 
are not required to be major market players.  Furthermore, antitrust actions require a 
showing of harm to the plaintiff…‖). 
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the defendant to any kind of damages from plaintiff.
167
 But as Morton Salt showed,
168
 
even though no money damages can be asserted against a patent owner on the basis of a 
holding of patent misuse, the prohibition on enforcing its patent rights against anyone can 
be a powerful deterrent to a patent owner.  
In 1988, Congress codified the patent misuse defense.
169
 The codification was 
done largely to specify some limits to the defense, as was made clear by Congress calling 
the bill the Patent Misuse Reform Act.
170
 But reflecting a growing understanding that not 
all tying agreements related to sales or licenses of patented goods are anticompetitive, the 
statute also prohibits the patent misuse defense based on tying unless the defendant can 
show that the patent owner had market power in the market for the patented product.
171
 
The first time a court applied the misuse defense to copyright came six years after 
Morton Salt in the case of M. Witmark & Sons v. Jensen.
172
 Here too the court based its 
copyright misuse inquiry in antitrust policy and looked at whether the copyright holders 
used their copyrights in anticompetitive ways. The conduct at issue was another tying 
arrangement, this time with respect to copyrighted music instead of patented goods.
173
 
Defendants were movie theater owners who were sued by the American Society of 
Composers, Authors, and Publishers (―ASCAP‖) for showing movies without licensing 
the public performance rights to the music contained in the movies. The motion picture 
producers purchased synchronization rights (which gave only the right to synchronize the 
music with the movie as part of the movie soundtrack), but individual movie theaters 
were left to purchase performance licenses for the music directly from ASCAP.
174
 For 
years ASCAP provided blanket licenses to movie theaters so that the theaters could show 
any movies in which ASCAP member artists had copyrights.
175
 Defendants claimed that 
the nature of the movie distribution business meant that they only learned shortly before 
exhibition what movies they would be showing.
176
 Thus, although defendants had the 
legal right to individually negotiate licenses with each artist holding a copyright in the 
music in each movie, as a practical matter, there was no time to complete individual 
licenses before the movie opened in their theaters.
177
 The defendants thus accused 
ASCAP of having a business practice that allowed ASCAP to hold up theater owners for 
licenses to the music in the movies.
 178
 Defendants seemed to believe that if the movie 
                                                 
167
 Cross & Yu, supra note 155, at 458-59. 
168
 Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 494 (1942). 
169
 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2006). 
170
 Patent Misuse Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 100-703, 102 Stat. 4676 (1988) (codified at 35 
U.S.C. § 271(d)(4) & (5). 
171
 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5). 
172
 M. Witmark & Sons v. Jensen, 80 F. Supp. 843 (D. Minn. 1948). 
173
 Id. at 848-49. 
174
 Id. at 844-45.  
175
 Id. at 845-56. 
176
 Id. at 845. 
177
 Id. 
178
 Id. at 845 (―The performance rights of any musical composition controlled by ASCAP 
may be licensed singly, but it appears that ASCAP‘s copyrighted music is always 
licensed as a group under a blanket license from ASCAP. And while the copyright 
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producers negotiated for public performance licenses along with their synchronization 
licenses, then ASCAP would not be able to charge such high prices for the music, or the 
movie producers could negotiate with the individual copyright holders directly. Because 
of ASCAP‘s licensing practices, however, over 80% of theaters purchased blanket 
licenses from ASCAP.
179
  
Eventually, the defendants in this case refused to purchase performance licenses 
for music for some movies and ASCAP sued. Defendants argued that under the 
circumstances, ASCAP was tying a requirement to license all of its music in a blanket 
license to the licensing of the music in the movies.
180
 The court found that the tying 
arrangement violated both antitrust law and constituted misuse. The court held that 
ASCAP was improperly trying to extend the copyright owners‘ rights to compensation 
for individual songs to a requirement that theater owners license all ASCAP songs.
181
 
Importantly, the court did not bother to determine whether antitrust law gave defendants 
the right to not purchase ASCAP‘s blanket licenses. Instead, the court held that the 
finding of misuse sufficed as a reason to refuse to enforce plaintiffs‘ copyrights against 
any theater owners.
182
 This shows an example of a court using copyright to enforce 
antitrust values without needing to determine whether all of the elements for the proposed 
remedy could be found in antitrust law. It also shows the powerful effect of a finding of 
copyright misuse—plaintiffs were unable to enforce their copyrights against the theater 
owners, who were thus left to freely engage in activity that otherwise was plainly 
infringing—publicly performing copyrighted music without a performance license. 
More recently, additional courts have recognized a defense of copyright misuse, 
some of them on grounds not based solely in antitrust concerns. In the 1990 case of 
Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds,
183
 the Fourth Circuit considered whether restrictive 
license provisions constituted misuse. Lasercomb America licensed manufacturing die-
design software to users with a license provision requiring licensees to not create a 
competing product for 99 years.
184
 Holiday Steel, defendant Reynold‘s employer, created 
                                                                                                                                                 
owners, including the plaintiffs herein…may deal individually with anyone seeking a 
license for the performance of their compositions publicly for profit, it seems that, in the 
licensing of the performance rights of the music integrated in a sound film, as a matter of 
practice theatre owners have but little opportunity to obtain licenses from the many 
individual copyright owners belonging to ASCAP who may have copyrighted music in 
the particular film purchased by the theatre owner.‖). 
179
 Id. 
180
 Id. 
181
 Id. at 850 (―One who unlawfully exceeds his copyright monopoly and violates the 
anti-trust laws is not outside the pale of the law, but where the Court‘s aid is requested, as 
noted herein, and the granting thereof would tend to serve the plaintiffs in their plan…to 
extend their copyrights in a monopolist control beyond their proper scope, it should be 
denied.‖). 
182
 Id. (―In view of the Court‘s finding that the copyright monopoly has been extended, it 
is not necessary to determine whether anti-trust violations alone would deprive plaintiffs 
of the right of recovery.‖). 
183
 Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990). 
184
 Id. at 973.    
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just such a product and was sued for infringement.
185
 Holiday Steel had received the 
agreement requiring it not to create a competing product, but it never signed and returned 
the document. Holiday Steel then proceeded to break Lasercomb‘s copy protections and 
make extra, unlicensed copies of Lasercomb‘s software for its internal use. Having 
succeeded at that, Holiday Steel eventually made additional copies of Lasercomb‘s 
software, tried to disguise it as its own, and marketed the software as its own. When it 
learned of Holiday Steel‘s activities, Lasercomb promptly sued for, inter alia, copyright 
infringement.  
Defendants argued that Lasercomb should not be allowed to enforce its copyrights 
against them because Lasercomb had misused its copyright by requiring licensees not to 
create competing products for 99 years. The district court dismissed this argument 
because defendants had not signed the agreement. But the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding 
that since some licensees did sign the agreement, Lasercomb had misused its copyright 
and therefore could not enforce it against anyone, including those who did not sign the 
agreement, like Holiday Steel.
186
 The Lasercomb court held that by preventing licensees 
from entering the product space, the plaintiff had impermissibly used its copyright to 
protect an idea rather than its expression.
187
 The court held that showing an antitrust 
violation was not essential to establish misuse.
188
 Instead, said the court, a plaintiff need 
only use its copyright in a manner violative of the public policies underlying copyright 
law to commit misuse.
189
 Although the court couched its language in terms of public 
policy, it is important to note that the court based its finding of copyright misuse on 
Lasercomb‘s anticompetitive behavior. Specifically, the court did not like Lasercomb‘s 
licensing of its copyright based on the agreement that its licensees would not compete 
with Lasercomb for 99 years.
190
 The court did not set forth a new basis for finding 
misuse, but rather used misuse as a shorthand way to avoid a full antitrust inquiry, even 
though agreements not to compete and use of market power to prevent competition are 
core behaviors that antitrust law seeks to prevent.
191
  
                                                 
185
  Id. at 971-72. 
186
 Id. at 979. 
187
 Id. at 978 (―Lasercomb undoubtedly has the right to protect against copying of the 
Interact code. Its standard licensing agreement, however, goes much further and 
essentially attempts to suppress any attempt by the licensee to independently implement 
the idea which Interact expresses.‖). 
188
 Id. (―So while it is true that the attempted use of a copyright to violate antitrust law 
probably would give rise to a misuse of copyright defense, the converse is not necessarily 
true-a misuse need not be a violation of antitrust law in order to comprise an equitable 
defense to an infringement action.‖). 
189
 Id. (―The question is not whether the copyright is being used in a manner violative of 
antitrust law (such as whether the licensing agreement is ―reasonable‖), but whether the 
copyright is being used in a manner violative of the public policy embodied in the grant 
of a copyright.‖). 
190
 Id. at 973. 
191
 See United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179, 31 S. Ct. 632, 648, 55 
L. Ed. 663, 693-94 (1911) (―‗restraint of trade‘ at common law and in the law of this 
country at the time of the adoption of the antitrust act only embraced acts or contracts or 
agreements or combinations which operated to the prejudice of the public interests by 
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Instead the court stated that any use of a copyright to ―secure an exclusive right or 
limited monopoly‖ beyond the copyright grant is contrary to the public policy of 
copyright. Under this tautological formulation, any licensing requirements found to be 
unrelated to the rights under the copyright grant can be subject to attack as misuse. 
Moreover, by ignoring the antitrust law that has grown up to make sophisticated 
judgments about when license restrictions or tying is anticompetitive, the court left itself 
open to crude judgments about competition that do not reflect the maturity of antitrust 
law. Nevertheless, Lasercomb marked the first time a court explicitly found copyright 
misuse and denied relief to a plaintiff based on the doctrine alone. Since the 1990 ruling, 
several courts have considered similar cases and adopted the Fourth Circuit‘s 
interpretation of misuse. 
The Ninth Circuit adopted Lasercomb‘s approach in Practice Management v. 
American Medical Association. That case involved another restrictive license provision 
as a basis for finding misuse.
192
 The American Medical Association (AMA) copyrighted 
a series of codes used for designating medical procedures and licensed their use with the 
provision that the licensee use no other system of codes.
193
 The Ninth Circuit held that 
the AMA had misused its copyright on the same grounds as in Lasercomb; specifically 
for licensing the copyright in the codes on the condition that licensees not use a 
competitor‘s service.194 The court also stated that a strict violation of antitrust law was 
not necessary to show misuse.
195
 But the court still based its finding of misuse on the 
same policy concerns underlying antitrust law. The court clearly thought the AMA‘s 
requirement of exclusive dealing from its copyright licensees was anticompetitive.  
In Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Technologies, Inc,
196
 the Fifth Circuit joined the 
Fourth and Ninth in recognizing copyright misuse, also relying on an implicit antitrust 
violation. In Alcatel, DGI was sued for infringement because it reverse engineered 
copyrighted software in order to produce compatible replacement hardware used in 
Alcatel telephone switches. Alcatel did not possess patents on the telephone switches 
themselves, but had copyrighted the operating system controlling the switch. The court 
found that Alcatel misused its copyright in leveraging it to claim patent-like protection 
                                                                                                                                                 
unduly restricting competition or unduly obstructing the due course of trade or which, 
either because of their inherent nature or effect, or because of the evident purpose of the 
acts, etc., injuriously restrained trade…‖); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 
U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933) (stating that the purpose of antitrust law is ―to prevent undue 
restraints of interstate commerce, to maintain its appropriate freedom in the public 
interest, to afford protection from the subversive or coercive interferences of 
monopolistic endeavor.‖).  
192
 Practice Management Information Corp. v. American Medical Ass‘n, 121 F.3d 516 
(9th
 
Cir. 1997). 
193
 Id. at 517-18. 
194
 Id. at 520 (―On the undisputed facts in the record before us, we conclude the AMA 
misused its copyright by licensing the CPT to HCFA in exchange for HCFA‘s agreement 
not to use a competing coding system.‖). 
195
 Id. at 521 (―We agree with the Fourth Circuit that a defendant in a copyright 
infringement suit need not prove an antitrust violation to prevail on a copyright misuse 
defense.‖). 
196
 Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Technologies, Inc., 166 F.3d 772 (5th Cir. 1999). 
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over the hardware.
197
 The court held that Alcatel‘s anticompetitive practices with regard 
to trying to extend its copyrights to cover hardware constituted misuse.
198
  
The Supreme Court has yet to rule on the extension of misuse to copyright, but 
some scholars believe that several cases indicate possible acceptance by the Court.
199
 
These cases each involve activities that raise antitrust-type concerns about 
anticompetitive behavior. In each case, defendants raised misuse defenses, but the Court 
ultimately decided for defendants solely on antitrust grounds. In United States v. Loew‟s, 
Inc. and United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc. the court found the block booking 
practice to be a violation of antitrust law using logic similar to patent misuse decisions.
200
 
The practice of block booking is very similar to tying; copyright owners make licenses to 
popular works contingent on the purchase of licenses to less desirable content. 
Theoretically, this allows copyright owners to leverage their economic power beyond 
their ―copyright monopoly.‖201 The Court accordingly held that the practices were 
anticompetitive in violation of the antitrust laws. But the opinions also included language 
suggesting that the copyright owners were engaged in activity that misused their 
copyrights by attempting to use them to capture additional exclusive rights outside of 
their copyright grants.
202
 
Broadcast Media, Inc. v. CBS, Inc. (―BMI‖) involved somewhat similar facts. 
There the Supreme Court considered a Second Circuit finding that Broadcast Media had 
                                                 
197
 Id. at 793 (―DSC indirectly seeks to obtain patent-like protection of its hardware-its 
microprocessor card-through the enforcement of its software copyright.‖). 
198
 Id. at 793-4 (―Any competing microprocessor card developed for use on DSC phone 
switches must be compatible with DSC‘s copyrighted operating system software. In order 
to ensure that its card is compatible, a competitor such as DGI must test the card on a 
DSC phone switch. Such a test necessarily involves making a copy of DSC‘s copyrighted 
operating system, which copy is downloaded into the card‘s memory when the card is 
booted up. If DSC is allowed to prevent such copying, then it can prevent anyone from 
developing a competing microprocessor card, even though it has not patented the card.‖). 
199
 See Scott A. Miskimon, Divorcing Public Policy from Economic Reality: The Fourth 
Circuit‟s Copyright Misuse Doctrine in Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 69 N.C. L. 
Rev. 1672, 1683-84 (1991) (―In United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc. the Supreme 
Court implicitly recognized the copyright misuse defense…In United States v. Loew‘s, 
Inc. the…Court‘s specific reference to the patent misuse defense…in conjunction with its 
uniform application of the antitrust laws to both patents and copyrights, suggests that the 
Loew‘s Court tacitly approved of a copyright misuse defense.‖). 
200
 e.g., U.S. v. Loew‘s, Inc., 371 US 38 (1962); U.S. v. Paramount Pictures, 334 US 131 
(1948); See Victoria Smith Ekstrand, Protecting the Public Policy Rationale of 
Copyright: Reconsidering Copyright Misuse, 11 COMM. L. & POL‘Y 565, 572 (2006). 
201
 But see infra notes 231-241 and accompanying text for critiques of whether tying 
actually allows monopolists to increase their economic power. 
202
 U.S. v. Loew‘s, Inc., 371 U.S. at 49 (―Accommodation between the statutorily 
dispensed monopoly in the combination of contents in the patented or copyrighted 
product and the statutory principles of free competition demands that extension of the 
patent or copyright monopoly by the use of tying agreements be strictly confined‖); U.S. 
v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. at 154 (―[T]he pooling of the purchasing power of an 
entire circuit in bidding for films is a misuse of monopoly power‖).  
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committed a per se violation of antitrust law and committed copyright misuse.
203
 In BMI, 
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. (―CBS‖) sued the copyright royalty collecting 
societies of ASCAP and BMI, as well as their members and affiliates, alleging antitrust 
violations and copyright misuse for the societies‘ practice of issuing blanket licenses to 
television stations like CBS for use of copyrighted music in television programming.
204
 
CBS alleged that ASCAP and BMI‘s practice of issuing blanket licenses amounted to 
price fixing by the individual copyright holder members of the two societies.
205
 The 
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the blanket licenses at issue were not naked 
restraints on trade with only anticompetitive purposes.
206
 Rather, the Court held that the 
license had the procompetitive features of integrating sales, and allowing monitoring and 
enforcement against unauthorized copying.
207
 The blanket license also drastically 
diminished transaction costs by allowing purchasers to buy only one license rather than 
negotiating for each song they wanted to use.
208
 Accordingly, the Court reversed the 
holding of per se antitrust violation, and remanded for analysis under the rule of 
reason.
209
 The Court also reversed the copyright misuse ruling because the Court viewed 
it as dependent on the antitrust claim.
210
 BMI is another example of copyright misuse 
claims that are closely tied to, if not duplicative of, antitrust claims. In BMI, once the 
court held that the actions of defendants had potential procompetitive features, the 
copyright misuse claim could not stand. Thus, while the Supreme Court has explicitly 
endorsed the patent misuse defense, it has never explicitly embraced the defense of 
copyright misuse. The Court has never condemned copyright misuse as a defense, and 
seems to think it may be appropriate where antitrust violations can be shown, but it has 
thus far not embraced the doctrine outright. 
                                                 
203
 Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979). 
204
 Id. at 4. 
205
 Id. CBS did not make the tying argument that was successful for plaintiffs in M. 
Witmark & Sons—that ASCAP and BMI were tying the license of any one copyrighted 
work to the requirement to purchase a blanket license. Such a claim would not have been 
successful because ASCAP and BMI only had the right to make non-exclusive licenses of 
their members‘ copyrighted works. Broadcast Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 4. Thus, television 
stations were free to negotiate directly with copyright owners if they wished. Moreover, 
since the television stations were in charge of their own programming, they could not 
very well argue that they were ignorant about what licenses they would need until the last 
minute, as did plaintiffs in Witmark. M. Witmark & Sons, 80 F. Supp. at 844-45. 
206
 Broadcast Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 20. 
207
 Id. at 20. 
208
 Id. at 21-22 (―The blanket license is composed of the individual compositions plus the 
aggregating service. Here, the whole is truly greater than the sum of its parts; it is, to 
some extent, a different product. The blanket license has certain unique characteristics: It 
allows the licensee immediate use of covered compositions, without the delay of prior 
individual negotiations and great flexibility in the choice of musical material.‖) (citations 
omitted). 
209
 Id. at 24. 
210
 Id. (―[T]his left the general import of its judgment that the licensing practices of 
ASCAP and BMI under the consent decree are per se violations of the Sherman Act. We 
reverse that judgment, and the copyright misuse judgment dependent upon it…‖). 
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More recently, a few lower courts have hinted at, though not fully embraced, a 
First Amendment basis for copyright misuse. The 1991 district court case of QAD, Inc. v. 
ALN Associates, Inc. concerned copyrighted software.
211
 The court allowed a copyright 
misuse defense that was based both on fraudulent claims the copyright owner made 
regarding which software it owned.
212
 ALN, accused of creating an infringing product, 
argued for misuse and alleged that QAD itself had used software copyrighted by Hewlett 
Packard in its own program.
213
 The court found this to be a basis for finding copyright 
misuse.
214
 But in addition to basing its decision that QAD had misused its copyright on 
QAD‘s fraudulent behavior, the QAD court referenced the First Amendment, stating that 
because copyright derives from freedom of expression, a copyright is misused when 
improperly asserted to inhibit another‘s expression.215 
It is important to note that the language of QAD makes clear that misuse based on 
First Amendment principles occurs only when another‘s expression is improperly and 
excessively inhibited. In certain situations, copyright allows owners to silence others 
despite their First Amendment speech rights, just as patents can allow monopoly power 
contrary to antitrust law. This principle is illustrated in Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena 
Vista Home Entertainment, where Video Pipeline accused Disney, Buena Vista‘s owners, 
of misuse because it included restrictions on criticism of Disney movies in its licensing 
agreements.
216
 In considering the issue, the Third Circuit decided that the misuse doctrine 
as defined by Lasercomb was available, but not applicable given the facts.
217
 The court 
                                                 
211
 QAD, Inc. v. ALN Associates, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 1261 (N.D. Ill. 1991). 
212
 Id. at 1270-71. 
213
 Id. at 1267 (―At the core of QAD‘s copyright misuse is its use of material in 
MFG/PRO that is not only not QAD‘s original work but work that was actually copied 
from HP250. Even worse, it was mostly that copied material that formed the focus of 
QAD‘s case against ALN for copyright infringement at the early stages of this litigation, 
when QAD sought and received injunctive relief against ALN.‖). 
214
 Id. at 1270(―QAD began to misuse its copyright over MFG/PRO when it attempted to 
extend its rights over material over which it had no copyright: those portions of its 
software that it copied from HP250…That copyright misuse extended QAD‘s copyright 
privilege beyond the scope of the grant and violated the very purpose of a copyright, 
which is to give incentive for authors to produce.‖). 
215
 Id. at 1265 (―Just as freedom of expression is the fount of copyright protection, so a 
copyright may not be asserted improperly to inhibit other persons‘ freedom of 
expression.‖). 
216
 Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entertainment, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 203 (3rd 
Cir. 2003) (―The Website in which the Trailers are used may not be derogatory to or 
critical of the entertainment industry or of [Disney]…As Video Pipeline sees it, such 
licensing agreements seek to use copyright law to suppress criticism and, in so doing, 
misuse those laws, triggering the copyright misuse doctrine.‖). 
217
 e.g., Id. at 206 (―Thus, while we extend the patent misuse doctrine to copyright, and 
recognize that it might operate beyond its traditional anti-competition context, we hold it 
inapplicable here. On this record Disney's licensing agreements do not interfere 
significantly with copyright policy…‖); Neal Hartzog, Gaining Momentum: A Review of 
Recent Developments Surrounding the Expansion of the Copyright Misuse Doctrine and 
Analysis of the Doctrine in its Current Form, 10 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 373, 
387 (2004) (―Although the Third Circuit ultimately held that the copyright misuse 
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felt the restrictions on criticism did not inhibit licensee expression to such a degree that 
would constitute misuse, so the assertion of copyright was proper.
218
 
Finally, in Assessment Technologies v. WIREdata, the Seventh Circuit ruled that 
the data at issue was not copyrightable, but the court also suggested that plaintiffs‘ claims 
of copyright where none existed might be copyright misuse.
219
 In that case, Assessment 
Technologies contracted with municipalities to collect and organize property value data.  
When WIREdata tried to access this information the municipalities refused fearing they 
would be guilty of infringement. The Seventh Circuit ruled that copyright did not protect 
the raw data and suggested Assessment Technologies may be guilty of copyright misuse 
because they claimed protection over something clearly not included in the copyright 
grant.
220
 The court also suggested that improperly asserting rights over defendants who 
lack the resources to resist could be misuse.
221
 
Although the defense of copyright misuse has been growing in acceptance by the 
courts,
222
 the Supreme Court has yet to decide that misuse is a valid defense, and several 
circuits still premise misuse on a showing of anticompetitive behavior.
223
 This puts the 
                                                                                                                                                 
doctrine was not applicable to the copyright owners, the court…officially recognized 
copyright misuse as a legitimate defense and adopted the public policy…analysis 
employed in Lasercomb and Practice Management.‖). 
218
 Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entertainment, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 206 (3rd 
Cir. 2003) (―[W]e nonetheless cannot conclude on this record that the agreements are 
likely to interfere with creative expression to such a degree that they affect in any 
significant way the policy interest in increasing the public store of creative activity.‖). 
219
 Assessment Technologies of WI, LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640 (7th Cir. 
2003). 
220
 Id. at 646-47 (―To try by contract or otherwise to prevent the municipalities from 
revealing their own data, especially when, as we have seen, the complete data are 
unavailable anywhere else, might constitute copyright misuse.‖). 
221
 Id. at 647 (―The argument for applying copyright misuse beyond the bounds of 
antitrust…is that for a copyright owner to use an infringement suit to obtain property 
protection, here in data, that copyright law clearly does not confer, hoping to force a 
settlement or even achieve an outright victory over an opponent that may lack the 
resources or the legal sophistication to resist effectively, is an abuse of process.‖). 
222
 Neal Hartzog, Gaining Momentum: A Review of Recent Developments Surrounding 
the Expansion of the Copyright Misuse Doctrine and Analysis of the Doctrine in its 
Current Form, 10 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 373, 391 (2004) (―[T]he Third 
Circuit has become the fourth federal circuit court to explicitly adopt the copyright 
misuse doctrine…which signals a growing acceptance of the doctrine that will likely lead 
to its adoption in some form by all of the circuits, and inevitably the Supreme Court.‖); 
Scott A. Sher, In Re Napster Inc. Copyright Litigation: Defining the Contours of the 
Copyright Misuse Doctrine, 18 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 325, 329-30 
(2002) (―The copyright misuse doctrine as defined by Lasercomb…has been expressly 
recognized by four circuits.  Several other circuits has been more reluctant to adopt the 
defense, and instead have adopted the doctrine…only where the defendant can link the 
misuse to an actual antitrust violation.‖). 
223
 e.g., Id. at 382; Victoria Smith Ekstrand, Protecting the Public Policy Rationale of 
Copyright: Reconsidering Copyright Misuse, 11 Comm. L. & Pol'y 565, 583 (2006) 
(―The courts in these cases…rejected notions that plaintiffs must first violate antitrust 
laws or infringe copyrights for defendants to assert the defense.  However, they represent 
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copyright misuse defense at a crossroads. For while acceptance of copyright misuse has 
grown, in recent years, antitrust-based misuse has been subject to strong criticism, 
especially in the area of patent law. If these criticisms are accepted by courts, the defense 
of antitrust-based misuse may go into inevitable decline in both patent and copyright 
cases. I discuss the critiques of antitrust-based misuse in the following section. In Part V I 
argue that courts should chose a new road for misuse and base it in First Amendment 
principles. 
B. Critiques of Patent and Copyright Misuse Based in 
Antitrust 
Curiously, at a time when copyright misuse seems to be catching on in the circuit 
courts as an analog to patent misuse, patent misuse itself may be on the decline as a 
defense courts are willing to apply in patent infringement suits. Although the patent 
misuse defense has a long history, its modern standing has been undercut by critiques 
both of patent misuse as a stand-alone defense to patent suits, and by shifting thinking on 
the anticompetitive effects of the supposedly anticompetitive conduct—principally tying 
arrangements—that previously have led courts to declare certain conduct patent misuse. 
Because these critiques of patent misuse apply with equal force to copyright misuse 
based in antitrust, I discuss the critiques of patent misuse in some detail. 
1. Critique 1: Antitrust Interests Are Better 
Vindicated Directly Through Antitrust Claims 
The first critique of the existence of a patent misuse defense essentially asks why 
pursue a problem indirectly through patent law that could better be handled by antitrust 
law? The critique argues that antitrust values can be vindicated directly by antitrust law, 
and courts seeking to vindicate such interests through the patent misuse defense tend to 
ignore tests for anticompetitive effects—like market power—that are essential to 
accurately determining antitrust issues.
224
 To the extent the misuse defense is based in 
antitrust and is thus concerned with tying or other attempts of the intellectual property 
holder to extend his patent or copyright monopoly, critics have argued that the analysis 
can be done directly under antitrust law with the addition of an antitrust claim.
225
 So long 
                                                                                                                                                 
a small fraction of cases compared to those in which the misuse defense was predicated 
upon a violation of antitrust law and a showing of harm to the defendant infringer.‖); G. 
Gervaise Davis III, The Affirmative Defense of Copyright Misuse and Efforts to Establish 
Trademark Misuse, and Fraud on the Copyright Office: Establishing Limitations on the 
Scope of Copyright Owners Rights Based on Several Theories, 867 PLI/Pat 103, 126 
(2006) (―Among these courts, three schools of thought predominate: (1) the view that 
misuse has nothing to do with antitrust principles…(2) the view that misuse requires a 
finding of antitrust violations…and (3) the intermediary approach reminiscent of the 
Fourth Circuit in Lasercomb…‖). 
224
 See Mark A. Lemley, Comment, The Economic Irrationality of the Patent Misuse 
Doctrine, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1599, 1613 (1990); Meg Dolan, Misusing Misuse: Why 
Copyright Misuse Is Unnecessary, 17 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 207 (2007). 
225
 See Roger Arar, Note, Redefining Copyright Misuse, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1291, 1310-
11 (1981) (―[C]ourts applying a misuse defense can do no better than to look to 
substantive antitrust principles….‖); Sean Michael Aylward, Comment, The Fourth 
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as the concern underlying a misuse claim is that specific behavior with regard to a patent 
or copyright is anticompetitive, there is no reason not to analyze such a claim within the 
formal structure of antitrust.
226
 The possession of market power via a patent or copyright 
does not give the patent or copyright owner any greater opportunities for anticompetitive 
behavior than the market power that comes from having monopoly power over any other 
resource that customers or competitors find necessary. In either case, the relevant inquiry 
is whether the actions that the monopoly-holder is taking with respect to a particular 
property (whether it be IP or something else, like a railroad terminal)  is likely to be more 
anticompetitive than procompetitive. Thus, the antitrust inquiry is similar whether a 
property owner ties an agreement not to compete to the license of a patent or to the 
provision of some other input that is necessary to a firm‘s business. In either case we 
should be concerned about anticompetitive effects to the extent that (1) the input 
(whether it be a patented product or any other input) does not have ready substitutes in 
the market such that others will not be able to compete for sales without the ability to 
make that input; (2) investing in making a substitute to the input is not practical; (3) there 
are no other factors that will discipline the monopolist‘s anticompetitive use of the input; 
and (4) there are no offsetting procompetitive effects.   
Antitrust law doctrine has had decades of experience working through the 
examination of these questions. In contrast, patent proceeds here by making rough 
determinations of competitive effects via deciding misuse defenses without the formal 
requirements of finding an antitrust violation and thus increases the likelihood of 
erroneous decisions to the extent that the elements necessary to find an antitrust violation 
reflect the considered wisdom of the courts over the more than a century since the 
enactment of federal antitrust laws.
227
  
                                                                                                                                                 
Circuit‟s Extension of the Misuse Doctrine to the Area of Copyright: A Misuse of the 
Misuse Doctrine?, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 661, 692-93 (1992) (noting that relying on 
antitrust principles for copyright misuse would ―add stability and predictability to the 
doctrine of misuse.‖). But see Ilan Charnelle, The Justification and Scope of the 
Copyright Misuse Doctrine and Its Independence of the Antitrust Laws, 9 UCLA ENT. L. 
REV. 167, 198-99 (2002) (arguing that ―[c]opyright misuse analysis does not and should 
not rest on antitrust law because antitrust law and copyright law view innovation and 
creativity in different manners,‖ but then focusing on determining inappropriate tying 
without the benefit of antitrust law). 
226
 See USM Corp. v. SPS Technology, Inc., 694 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1982) (rejecting 
holding patent misuse claims to lower standards than antitrust claims, and explaining that 
―[o]ur law is not rich in... concepts of monopolistic abuse; and it is rather late in the day 
to try to develop one without in the process subjecting the rights of patent holders to 
debilitating uncertainty.‖). But see Kenneth J. Burchfiel, Patent Misuse and Antitrust 
Reform: “Blessed be the Tie?” 4 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 1 (1991) (defending doing 
shorthand analysis of allegedly anticompetitive behavior through patent misuse because 
the antitrust standard is difficult and expensive). 
227
 But see Note, Is the Patent Misuse Doctrine Obsolete?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1922, 
1934-35 (1997) (arguing that there may be reason to apply the patent misuse defense to a 
larger scope of activity than antitrust law so as to protect innovation markets, but 
acknowledging the difficulty of coming up with an administrable system for deciding 
such misuse defenses); Ramsey Hanna, Note, Misusing Antitrust: The Search for 
Functional Misuse Standards, 46 STAN. L. REV. 401, 423-24 (1994) (arguing that a 
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2. Critique 2: Patent Uses That Courts Have Ruled 
Anticompetitive in the Past Actually May Be 
Harmless or Even Procompetitive 
In Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc.,
228
 The Supreme Court 
officially recognized the obvious fact that patents and copyrights do not necessarily give 
their owners market power.
229
 In that case, the Court acknowledged that if there are 
market substitutes for the patented or copyrighted product, then the owner of the product 
will not be able to charge above-market prices because consumers will simply switch to 
available substitute goods if the patent or copyright owner raises her prices.
230
 Thus, in 
many cases a patent or copyright gives its owner the right to exclude others from making 
exactly the patented or copyrighted product, but does not give any power to control the 
market for goods of the patented or copyrighted type. 
The misuse defense is also being undercut by shifting thinking on the types of 
behavior that cause anticompetitive effects. Specifically, the single monopoly profit 
theory holds that a monopolist cannot extract the same monopoly profit twice simply by 
tying a product in a competitive market to sales of a product over which the monopolist 
has monopoly power.
231
 Accordingly, a number of scholars have argued that when firms 
with monopoly power in a product engage in tying, there must be a procompetitive or 
efficiency reason for the tie.
232
 For example, firms with market power in a product may 
engage in tying for the procompetitive reason of quality assurance. If a complex machine 
requires regular and delicate service, or works best with only certain parts, a seller of the 
machine may desire to tie service to the product to ensure that the machine‘s reputation 
for reliability is not damaged. Likewise, tying two goods together might decrease the cost 
                                                                                                                                                 
narrow application of misuse independent of antitrust can take into account harm to long-
term innovation that antitrust cannot adequately protect). 
228
 Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006). 
229
 Id. at 35.   
230
 See id. at 44-45. 
231
 See Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE 
L.J. 19, 21-23 (1957); Aaron Director and Edward H Levi, Law and the Future: Trade 
Regulation, 51 NW. U. L. REV. 281, 290-94 (1956); ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST 
PARADOX (1978); RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 
(2001); Thomas F. Cotter, Misuse, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 901, 939 note 169 (2007). 
232
 See, e.g., Bork, supra note 13; David S. Evans & A. Jorge Padilla, Designing Antitrust 
Rules for Assessing Unilateral Practices: A Neo-Chicago Approach, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 
73, 82 (2005) (when a monopolist engages in tying, the practice is presumed 
procompetitive); Alan J. Meese, Antitrust Balancing in a (Near) Coasean World: The 
Case of Franchise Tying Contracts, 95 MICH. L. REV. 111, 114 (1996) (tying is 
procompetitive and would be engaged in regardless of the presence of market power). 
Note that the terms ―procompetitive‖ and ―efficiency‖ are synonymous if by each we 
mean maximizing total welfare of society, including both producer and consumer 
welfare. But courts deciding antitrust cases have not thus far embraced as 
―procompetitive‖ actions that increase total welfare at the expense of consumer welfare. 
Thus, for example, while a firm with market power over a product can increase total 
welfare by engaging in perfect price discrimination, the amount of consumer welfare is 
decreased by the firm‘s price discrimination. Thus, although an economist would say that 
this is a welfare-enhancing move, a court may not. 
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of selling or delivering, or might increase value to consumers (e.g., selling batteries in 
packages with electronics).
233
 In addition, tying may allow a seller to effectively provide 
financing to a purchaser of expensive equipment.
234
 A seller could accomplish this by 
selling the equipment below price, and then charging prices greater than costs for 
products that need to be consumed to use the machine.
235
 This would allow the customer 
to pay the full price of the equipment over time.
236
 Finally, tying can allow price 
discrimination, which may either increase or decrease both consumer and total welfare.
237
 
Perfect price discrimination would eliminate all consumer surplus, but would also 
eliminate all deadweight loss from monopoly, thus giving maximum efficiency and the 
highest level of total welfare to society.
238
 But partial price discrimination may result in 
situations that are neutral, or even harmful to total welfare, depending on the elasticities 
of consumers and other suppliers.
239
 In addition, some have argued that price 
                                                 
233
 For an overview of how tying be efficient and welfare-enhancing, see EINER 
ELHAUGE, UNITED STATES ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS, 357-58 (2008). 
234
 Id.  
235
 Id. 
236
 Id. 
237
 Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the single Monopoly Profit 
Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397, 427 (2009). 
238
 See id. at 480, n.7. (―At a uniform monopoly price, buyers who value the product 
above that price enjoy consumer surplus. Perfect price discrimination transfers all that 
consumer surplus to the seller…[and in turn] increases total ex post welfare because it 
eliminates all deadweight loss by producing all output that some buyer values above 
cost.‖); RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 183, 206-07 
(1976); HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 231 (1985); ROBERT 
BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 295, 375 (1978).  
Daniel Clough, Law and Economics of Vertical Restraints in Australia, 25 MELB. U. L. 
REV. 551, 555 (2001). 
239
 See Michael L. Katz, Nonuniform Pricing, Output and Welfare Under Monopoly, 50 
REV. ECON. STUD. 37 (1983) (noting that a move from uniform pricing to second-degree 
price discrimination creates unpredictable effects for social welfare); Marius Schwartz, 
Third-Degree Price Discrimination and Output: Generalizing a Welfare Result, 80 AM. 
ECON. REV. 1259 (1990) (contending that, within a partial equilibrium analysis, a change 
from uniform pricing to third-degree price discrimination will in some cases increase 
welfare and in others it will be reduced); Yochai Benkler, An Unhurried View of Private 
Ordering in Information Transactions, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2063 (2000) (arguing that 
because price discrimination is costly to implement, whether it is socially beneficial will 
depend on whether enhanced consumer access to excludable works will outweigh the loss 
from reduction in free access to previously non-excluded works); Julie E. Cohen, 
Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1799 (2000) (noting that evidence 
from real life implies that contractual price discrimination is not as streamlined as some 
proponents contend); Wendy J. Gordon, Intellectual Property as Price Discrimination: 
Implications for Contract, 73 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1367 (1998) (finding that  price 
discrimination at best mitigates the undesirable effects of monopolies, but that it may 
―raise price and reduce quantities, without yielding any incentive payoff large enough to 
compensate‖); Michael J. Meurer, Price Discrimination, Personal Use and Piracy: 
Copyright Protection of Digital Works, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 845 (1997) (expressing doubts 
about whether price discrimination results in efficiency gains).  
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discrimination may allow a patent holder to extract more return on its invention than 
Congress intended.
240
 
Of course, while there are the above possible procompetitive effects from tying, in 
any particular case a monopolist may argue falsely that its tying behavior has a 
procompetitive. For instance, arguments that other service or parts providers will provide 
inferior service or parts, or that tying reduces costs may be false or pretextual. 
In addition, scholars have made a number of critiques of the single monopoly 
profit theory, and have argued that there are situations in which a monopolist can, indeed, 
leverage its monopoly in one product into excess power in another market. For instance, 
tying may allow a monopolist to price in the tying and tied market in such a way that a 
potential new entrant who can enter only one of the markets is deterred from making the 
cost investment to enter that market because the returns to investment are low.
241
    
C. Whither Misuse Defenses Based on Antitrust 
Principles? 
The critiques and counter-critiques of both antitrust-based misuse defenses and of 
tying more generally lead one to ask: will a patent or copyright misuse defense based on 
antitrust principles continue to be viable? There is much to learn from studying the 
modern debate on patent and copyright misuse and on tying, but how shall we decide 
cases while the debate is ongoing? It turns out that attempting to apply modern, 
sophisticated economic analysis to determine whether the conduct in ―traditional‖ patent 
misuse cases is actually anticompetitive is quite difficult, at least without substantially 
more evidence.  
For instance, in Morton Salt,
242
 the defendant might have made a quality 
argument to justify its tying. In the very similar case of International Salt v. United 
States,
243
 the defendant made just such an argument.
244
 Recall that Morton Salt tied a 
requirement to buy salt tablets to its sales of its patented salt-tablet insertion equipment 
that was used in industrial canning processes.
245
 Similarly, International Salt leased its 
patented salt-injection equipment to industrial canners contingent on the industrial 
canners buying their salt from International Salt.
246
 When accused of anticompetitive 
                                                 
240
 Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV L. REV. 
1815 (1984) (―price discrimination also raises the problem of disproportionately high 
rewards to patentees, which . . . can make for bad patent policy independent of how such 
discrimination fares under antitrust analysis.‖). 
241
 See Barry Nalebuff, Bundling as an Entry Barrier, 119 Q.J. ECON. 159, 160-61 
(2004); Michael D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 
837, 840-46 (1990). 
242
  Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942). 
243
 International Salt v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947). 
244
 Id. at 396-97. 
245
 Morton, 314 U.S. at 490-91/ 
246
 International Salt, 332 U.S. at 394-95. It is interesting to note that while Morton Salt 
was ruled to have misused its patents, the patent misuse defense does not seem to have 
been raised in International Salt. It certainly was not addressed by the Supreme Court, at 
any rate. This shows how duplicative an antitrust-based misuse defense can be of 
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tying, just as Morton Salt was, International Salt sought to justify its tying arrangement 
by arguing that the tie increased the longevity of its equipment. Specifically, International 
Salt argued that competitors‘ salts had lower sodium chloride content and higher 
percentages of insoluble impurities, which disturbed the functioning of International 
Salt‘s equipment and increased maintenance costs. Because International Salt was 
obligated to repair and maintain the machines under the leases,
247
 it argued that it was 
reasonable to require that its own high quality salt be purchased by the equipment lessees.  
International Salt also argued that the structure of its tying arrangement prevented 
it from extracting above-market prices for salt because International Salt only had a right 
of first refusal to make the salt sales.
248
 If a customer could find salt of equal quality for a 
lower price than International Salt offered, then the customer was obligated to notify 
International Salt and give it an opportunity to match the price.
249
 But if International Salt 
did not match the price, the agreement allowed the customer to buy from the lower-priced 
salt provider.
250
 In the end, the Court rejected International Salt‘s defenses, holding that if 
International Salt was really concerned that only high quality salt be used in its machines, 
a less-restrictive means of achieving that goal was simply to require the use of salt above 
a certain grade as a condition of the lease.
251
 
Notwithstanding the Court‘s decision in International Salt, the facts of the case 
cast doubt on an anticompetitive effect from the tying at issue. First, the Court did not 
require any showing of any significant foreclosure in the salt market.
252
 Second, the 
Court‘s proposed less-restrictive alternative—that International Salt simply require the 
use of high-grade salt as a condition of the lease—was unlikely to assure the usage of 
high quality salt so long as International Salt had the responsibility to repair and maintain 
the machines. In such a situation, the industrial canners would have an incentive to use 
lower-quality, lower-priced salt, and let the costs of extra maintenance fall on 
International Salt. So the tie could very well have been the most efficient way to assure 
that high quality salt was used. Moreover, the requirement that International Salt match 
the price of its lowest-price competitor for equivalent quality salt meant that International 
Salt could not supracompetitively price its salt unless there was collusion in the entire salt 
market.  
But note that it is still possible that the tying in International Salt allowed some 
kind of anticompetitive behavior, such as price leadership if the market was collusive 
(although that is hard to imagine in a market for a staple product like salt). Or 
                                                                                                                                                 
conventional antitrust analysis.  
247
 Note that this was also a tie: service was tied to the lease of the patented equipment. 
This tie did not seem to concern the Court, however, suggesting that the Court implicitly 
thought some ties could be beneficial. 
248
 International Salt, 332 U.S. at 396-97.  
249
 Id. 
250
 Id. 
251
 Id. at 397.    
252
 In fact, scholarly analysis casts doubt on any market foreclosure. See J. Peterman, The 
International Salt Case, 22 J.L. & ECON. 351 (1979) (finding that salt sales made to 
supply one of International Salt‘s two types of leased machines accounted for only 4% of 
salt sales in the relevant geographic areas). 
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International Salt may have falsely asserted that a competitor‘s lower-priced salt was of 
lower quality, and thus that customers were obligated to buy International Salt‘s higher-
priced salt. But one would think that competitors could prove the quality of their salt 
fairly easily. And even if International Salt were able to tie its salt to its equipment and 
charge supracompetitive prices for the salt, it is hard to see how International Salt would 
have been able to get more than a single monopoly profit here, as there does not seem to 
have been any likelihood that the tie could foreclose a significant amount of the salt 
market.  
Likewise, the outcome of cases regarding block booking movies, like United 
States v. Loew‟s,253 and United States v. Paramount,254 would be uncertain in light of the 
modern sophisticated economic critiques and defenses of misuse defenses and tying 
practices. The foreclosure effect from block booking is certainly much greater than the 
foreclosure effect in the salt market in Morton Salt. Loews or Paramount may have been 
able to keep rivals out of certain markets by block booking, especially if there were 
specific costs to getting into certain markets (although no obvious reasons for large entry 
costs come to mind). But there may also have been efficiency cost-saving reasons for 
block booking, and the single monopoly profit theory may apply here as one would 
expect theater owners to look at the costs of showing the block of movies from Loews or 
Paramount as opposed to the costs of showing a variety of movies from others. Other 
cases, like the M. Witmark & Sons
255
 case would not occur these days because movie 
soundtracks are so integrated into movies that they are obviously a single product, 
although one for which the producer and distributor must clear many intellectual property 
rights.
256
  
Regardless of what would be the most efficient outcome in each of the above 
cases, one can see that the complexity of determining the pro and anti-competitive effects 
of copyright owners‘ restrictive uses of their copyrights makes determining when and if a 
antitrust-based misuse defense should apply quite difficult. Moreover, the complexity of 
the determinations can be cited as a justification for doing such analysis solely within an 
antitrust context in which the complex balancing and analysis of pro and anticompetitive 
arguments has been worked out (and continues to be worked out) over more than a 
century. This debate has yet to be resolved, but the future of a misuse defense grounded 
in anticompetitive behavior seems to be on the decline. 
V. THE CASE FOR BASING COPYRIGHT MISUSE ON FIRST 
AMENDMENT SPEECH INTERESTS 
How should copyright respond at this critical juncture in the regime‘s history? 
Just as copyright law is embracing misuse borrowed from patent law, such antitrust-based 
                                                 
253
 United States v. Loew‘s Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962).   
254
 United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 US 131 (1948).  
255
 Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643 (1943).   
256
 See DONALD E. BIEDERMAN ET AL., LAW AND BUSINESS OF THE ENTERTAINMENT 
INDUSTRIES 744-46, 799-802, 840-48 (5th ed. 2007); Sara K. Stadler, Performance 
Values, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV.  697, 731 (2008); DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL YOU NEED 
TO KNOW ABOUT THE MUSIC BUSINESS 231-33, 416-17 (6th ed. 2006). 
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misuse seems to be on the decline. I propose that as we evaluate copyright misuse at this 
crossroads, we should not continue to base it in antitrust principles, and thus sentence it 
to likely decline. Instead, it should be firmly and primarily grounded in First Amendment 
speech interests. While the debates about tying and antitrust-based misuse can and should 
determine the future of the patent misuse defense, these debates should not determine the 
future of the copyright misuse defense because the First Amendment provides a separate, 
and more compelling, policy basis for copyright misuse than does antitrust. Restrictive 
uses of patents and patent tying raise economic concerns, but do not raise speech issues 
because everyone remains free to study, copy, comment on, and disseminate a patent—
they just may not build the patented invention without permission. Thus, a patent may 
give its owner economic power
257
 but it does not give its owner power to control the 
speech of others.  
The copyright grant is quite another thing. While a patent prohibits only making, 
using, or selling a patented invention, but not dissemination of the patent document itself, 
the very purpose of copyright law is to give the owner of the copyright the power to limit 
copying and dissemination of the copyrighted document. Thus, anyone wanting to quote 
from the copyrighted work, whether to comment on the work itself or as part of another 
project, must either receive permission from the copyright holder or have a valid fair use 
defense to copyright infringement. The difficulties with exercising valid fair use rights, 
and the ability of copyright owners to deter valid fair use of their works by threatening 
lawsuits, even if meritless, have been discussed in detail in Part II, above. This imbalance 
in power between copyright owners and would-be fair users frustrates the balance set by 
Congress between copyright protection and the socially optimal amount of unlicensed use 
of copyrighted works.
258
 While a number of proposals have been made to strengthen or 
clarify fair use, or to make fair use determinations less costly,
259
 if we are interested in 
simply making more practically available the fair use rights that Congress set out as 
legally available under Section 107 of the Copyright Act, then allowing an argument of 
copyright misuse based in First Amendment interests as a defense to copyright 
infringement claims and threats could go a good distance to effectuating these rights.  
As discussed above in Part II, copyright cases often raise First Amendment 
speech concerns. It is quite often the case that the best way to engage with, comment on, 
critique, or explain the speech of someone else is to quote portions of that speech 
directly. In other cases, using the ideas proposed by someone else may require some use 
of the original expression of the ideas. When such original expression is subject to 
copyright, the copyright holder‘s exclusive right to control other‘s copying of his original 
expression can run smack into the First Amendment speech interests of the person 
seeking to quote the copyrighted work. As explored in Parts I and II, this well-recognized 
conflict between copyright law and First Amendment speech interests,
260
 led to the 
development of two doctrines within copyright law that protect and accommodate First 
Amendment speech interests with regard to copyrighted works: the idea/expression 
                                                 
257
 Although a patent does not necessarily convey any market power. See supra notes 228 
- 230 and accompanying text. 
258
 17 U.S.C.§ 107 (2006). 
259
 See supra Part III. 
260
 See supra notes 89 - 103 and accompanying text. 
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dichotomy and the fair use doctrine. Both serve to explicitly balance the interests a 
copyright holder has his exclusive rights to his copyrighted expression against the 
interests of others in making use of the copyright holder‘s work in service of First 
Amendment speech values.
261
  
Notwithstanding some fair criticisms,
262
 the fair use analysis codified in the 
Copyright statute is overall a solid vehicle for allowing courts to consider all of the 
factors that weigh for and against fair use. But in the real world of copyright 
enforcement, copyright owners often have the power to prevent subsequent uses of 
copyrighted material that are obviously allowed under the fair use section of the statute. 
As I have described above,
263
 copyright holders can deter many fair uses by threatening 
to sue for copyright infringement. Because there is enough gray area to determining fair 
use,
264
 because the cost of defending a copyright infringement suit is high,
265
 and because 
a copyright holder can control whether and when to sue, and when to dismiss the suit if it 
starts going against him,
266
 the mere threat of litigation will deter many uses of 
copyrighted material that are fair as a matter of law.
267
 This is a misuse of the copyright 
power granted by statute. But in many cases, it is not an anticompetitive misuse designed 
to increase profits for the copyright holder. Rather, the core of cases in which legal fair 
uses are being prevented are those in which the copyright holder desires to squelch 
particular speech about, or particular use of, his copyrighted material that he finds 
personally objectionable, as was the case with the Joyce Estate‘s attempts to prevent 
Carol Shloss‘s fair use.268  
If we shift the policy basis for a copyright misuse defense from antitrust law to 
First Amendment speech interests, courts can focus on discouraging copyright misuse to 
chill speech. Such a shift is warranted for two reasons. First, as the above critiques of 
antitrust-based misuse point out,
269
 antitrust law provides protection against the very 
anticompetitive behavior that courts have used misuse to address, perhaps with more 
accurate results.
270
 Second, the misuse of copyright to chill speech is not protected, as a 
practical matter, by another body of law. Thus, shifting the basis for the copyright misuse 
defense from a focus on anticompetitive behavior to a focus on speech-chilling behavior 
will provide practical protection for fair use rights that are not currently provided by any 
other area of law. Not only is such a shift in the foundations of a copyright misuse 
defense desirable, it is a solution that can readily be implemented by the courts. Although 
the misuse defense was developed with an eye to prevent anticompetitive behavior, it is 
an equitable defense developed by the courts, and thus subject to revision by the 
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 See supra Part III. 
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 See supra Part II. 
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 See supra notes 94- 105 and accompanying text. 
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 See supra notes 110-113 and accompanying text.  
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 See supra note 115 and accompanying text.  
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 See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.    
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COPYRIGHTMISUSE.DOC 3/18/2010  10:19 AM 
44  [Vol.  
courts.
271
 This Article shows that the anticompetitive behavior with which courts have 
generally been concerned in misuse cases can be addressed (perhaps better) through 
antitrust law. But the speech-chilling misuse of copyrights cannot be addressed in other 
areas of the law, nor does fair use give practical protection against such speech-chilling 
misuse of copyrights. Thus, in determining whether a copyright holder has behaved with 
clean enough hands that its copyrights should be enforced by a court in equity, it is 
entirely right and proper for courts to focus on whether copyright holders have misused 
their copyrights by bad-faith efforts to deter fair uses of copyrighted materials. 
A speech-focused copyright misuse defense will provide the practical protection 
for fair use that is now missing by making it potentially more costly for copyright owners 
to try to stop fair use. Once a First Amendment based copyright misuse defense is 
widely-recognized by the courts, copyright owners suing for copyright infringement will 
have to worry about whether a court might refuse to enforce their copyrights because they 
have engaged in copyright misuse either with respect to the defendant in suit, or anyone 
else. Recall that in Lasercomb the court refused to enforce plaintiff‘s copyright not only 
against the victims of plaintiff‘s misuse, but against anyone—even a defendant who had 
copied Lasercomb‘s software and marketed it as its own. Thus, because of this unique 
characteristic of the misuse defense—that misuse against anyone can result in an inability 
to enforce the copyright against everyone—a copyright misuse defense based in speech 
interests will cause copyright owners to think carefully before engaging in possible 
misuse of their copyrights. If the price of deterring fair use could include the inability to 
collect copyright royalties from anyone for a period of time, one would expect copyright 
owners to be much more reticent to engage in behavior that might constitute misuse. 
A few commentators have discussed expanding the policy basis for copyright 
misuse from antitrust to a broader conception of misuse that includes prohibiting use of a 
copyright that violates public policy. Some commentators have even suggested that 
violation of First Amendment speech interests could be part of the basis for copyright 
misuse. But no one has made the case articulated in this Article—that the copyright 
misuse defense must be completely decoupled from antitrust theory and based firmly on a 
policy of protecting First Amendment speech interests.  
Recent reform proposals for copyright misuse include Thomas Cotter‘s 
suggestion that copyright and patent misuse doctrine should be reformed so as to make 
the doctrine more predictable and to better serve patent and copyright policies.
272
 Cotter‘s 
approach allows misuse to focus both on anticompetitive and other harms from the 
misuse of patents and copyrights. Cotter argues that the inquiry should be whether 
particular conduct broadens the scope of the patent or copyright grant.
273
 Once 
problematic behavior is identified, Cotter urges courts to develop a more predictable set 
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 Cf. Joe Potenza et al., Patent Misuse—The Critical Balance, a Patent Lawyer‟s View, 
15 FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 69, 69, 100 (2005) (―The roots of patent misuse lay in the law of 
patents (that is, the doctrine of unclean hands), not the law of antitrust. . . . [I]n this 
equitable doctrine, the law cannot stand still or else it will not continue to protect the 
underlying rationale of the patent system or the ever-changing concept the patent system 
itself protects—innovation.‖). 
272
 Thomas F. Cotter, Misuse, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 901 (2007). 
273
 Id. at 963. 
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of criteria for determining misuse, preferably by focusing on a handful of recurring 
situations such as overbroad contractual restrictions on reverse engineering or that 
prohibit the licensee from engaging in fair use.
274
 Cotter also urges the imposition of a 
standing requirement that would allow the misuse defense to be raised only by those 
against whom misuse occurred.
275
 Finally, the remedy for misuse would simply be that a 
challenged contractual provision would be unenforceable.
276
  
Although Cotter‘s suggestions have merit when it comes to adding predictability 
to misuse determinations, his approach would actually lead to even less protection against 
copyright holders who threaten litigation to deter fair use. Cotter‘s approach would allow 
contractual provisions forbidding fair use to be voided, but this would provide little 
deterrence as against copyright holders who would seek to threaten or pursue litigation to 
deter fair use. Moreover, Cotter‘s restriction of standing to include only those against 
whom misuse has occurred would allow copyright holders to be strategic in their misuse 
of their copyrights because only those who have signed contractual provisions that 
constitute misuse could sue. Thus, under Cotter‘s proposal copyright holders could 
threaten litigation against would-be fair users without worry of having to defend a misuse 
claim so long as they do not enter into contracts with the would-be fair users. Thus, one 
of the two features that makes misuse uniquely effective as a deterrent
277—the ability to 
defend based on a copyright holder‘s misuse of his patent against anyone—would 
disappear under Cotter‘s system.  
Other commentators have suggested that the policy rationale underlying copyright 
misuse could be broadened to include considerations of the ―public policy‖ underlying 
copyright law, which may include considering speech and fair use interests.
278
 But none 
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 Id. at 963-64. 
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 Id. at 960-62.   
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 Id. at 934.  
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 The other feature that makes misuse uniquely effective as a deterrent is that the result 
of a misuse finding is that the copyright holder cannot assert his copyright against anyone 
until the misuse is cured. See supra note 155 - 156 and accompanying text.  
278
 See, e.g., Note, Clarifying the Copyright Misuse Defense: the Role of Antitrust 
Standards and First Amendment Values, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1289, 1307-08 (1991) 
(urging application of full antitrust analysis in determining competition questions via 
misuse, but also stating, without further exploration, that the public policy underlying 
copyright law—including the First Amendment interests in dissemination of ideas—is a 
suitable basis for finding copyright misuse); John Baker McClanahan, Note, Copyright 
Misuse as a Defense in an Infringement Action: Lasercomb America Inc. v. Reynolds, 49 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 213, 234-35 (1992) (examining the Lasercomb case and asserting, 
without further exploration, that ―[t]he scope of this [copyright misuse] defense, however, 
should not be limited either by an antitrust standard or by the statutory development of 
patent misuse. Instead, the scope of the copyright misuse defense should extend to the 
point where the copyright owner has extended the copyright beyond the grant and, 
therefore, has subverted public policy.‖) (internal citations omitted); .    Aaron Xavier 
Fellmeth, Copyright Misuse and the Limits of the Intellectual Property Monopoly¸  6 J. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 1 (1998) (urging generally that ―courts should steer the (copyright) 
misuse defense away from straight antitrust analysis. . . . A public policy/equity defense, 
combined with the possibility of a separate antitrust suit in cases of flagrantly 
anticompetitive behavior, should suffice to protect licensees and competitors while 
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of these proposals recognize the need to make First Amendment principles the first and 
primary basis for the copyright misuse defense. I believe that failing to base the copyright 
misuse defense in First Amendment principles will lead to confused decisionmaking that 
does not adequately prevent the chilling of speech that copyright misuse is uniquely 
situated to deter. Having both antitrust and ―public policy‖ as the bases for copyright 
misuse invites confusion and diverts courts attentions away from providing practical 
protections for fair use rights. Nor is the solution to advise courts to decide copyright 
misuse defenses by focusing only on the ―public policy‖ underlying copyright law. This 
approach again diverts focus from the protection of First Amendment speech interests 
that copyright misuse is uniquely situated to accomplish, and it also risks confused and 
inconsistent decisions given the number of competing policies at work in copyright 
law,
279
 including the policy of granting authors rewards of exclusive rights for their 
works so as to assure that they have adequate incentives to create works.
280
 If a court 
                                                                                                                                                 
deterring clear antitrust violations by copyright owners.‖); Brett Frischmann & Dan 
Moylan, The Evolving Common Law Doctrine of Copyright Misuse: A Unified Theory 
and Its Application to Software, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 865 (2000) (proposing ―narrow 
public policy-based per se rules [to] supplement a core antitrust-based [misuse] 
defense‖); William F. Patry & Richard A. Posner, Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the 
Wake of Eldred, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1639, 1645 (2004) (―The doctrine of copyright misuse 
is thus applicable where litigation is threatened in an effort to extract a licensing fee or 
other profit when there is no reasonable basis for supposing that the threatener's copyright 
has been infringed.‖). But see Sean Michael Aylward, Comment, The Fourth Circuit‟s 
Extension of the Misuse Doctrine to the Area of Copyright: A Misuse of the Misuse 
Doctrine?, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 661, 692 (1992) (opining that copyright misuse‘s 
policy basis is broader than antitrust, but should not be.) 
279
 While courts focus on the incentive purpose of copyright, they focus on it in different 
ways and balance it in different ways with the public‘s interest in dissemination and the 
public domain. See, e.g., Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 
(1975) (―The core purpose of copyright law is ‗to secure a fair return for an author‘s 
creative labor‘ and thereby ‗to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.‘‖); 
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (―The economic philosophy behind the clause 
empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that 
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public 
welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in ‗Science and useful Arts.‘ 
Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards commensurate with 
the services rendered.‖); Paul Goldstein, 1 GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT, § 1.14.2, at 1:57 
(3d ed. 2006 & Supp. 2008) (discussing copyright‘s ―general object of encouraging the 
production and dissemination of the widest possible variety of literary and artistic works 
desired by consumers‖); 1 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT § 1.03 (noting the ―authorization to grant to individual authors the limited 
monopoly of copyright is predicated upon the dual premises that the public benefits from 
the creative activities of authors, and that the copyright monopoly is a necessary 
condition to the full realization of such creative activities. Implicit in this rationale is the 
assumption that in the absence of such public benefit, the grant of a copyright monopoly 
to individuals would be unjustified. This appears to be consonant with the pervading 
public policy against according private economic monopolies in the absence of 
overriding countervailing considerations.‖) 
280
 Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 545-46 (1985) (finding the 
limited grant of the copyright is a means of incentivizing the creation of works for the 
public to access); Sony Corp of Amer. V. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 
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focuses on this ―public policy‖ of copyright law, it may end up ruling that copyright 
misuse should not apply even in cases where a copyright owner seeks to use its copyright 
to squelch important speech that has no effect on the copyrighted work‘s market value. In 
my view, this would be a plainly inferior application of the copyright misuse defense. 
What would a copyright misuse defense based firmly in First Amendment policy 
look like? First, defendants to a copyright suit could enter evidence of any attempts by 
the copyright holder to chill obvious fair use through use of litigation or threats of 
litigation. But focusing copyright misuse on First Amendment values will sweep up more 
than just bad faith attempts to deter fair use. If we take seriously the copyright holder‘s 
obligation not to use his copyright to chill First Amendment protected speech of others, 
then certain restrictions in copyright licenses will also fall afoul of the misuse defense. In 
some ways this First Amendment application of copyright misuse would be similar to the 
analysis that courts have traditionally performed in deciding misuse defenses, except that 
instead of looking for an economic tie, courts would look to whether a copyright holder 
has tied his grant of copyright permission to restrictions on the speech interest of the 
licensee of the work. An example might be a copyright license agreement that allows a 
writer to quote from the copyright owner‘s copyrighted work, but only so long as the 
copyright owner has editorial control over the content of the writer‘s work. Such a tie of 
editorial control to a copyright license would be a misuse of copyright for attempting to 
leverage the copyright not for financial gain, but to chill First Amendment speech of 
others. Similarly, any licensing requirements that forbid inquiry into certain areas, or that 
would otherwise seek to control the content of the licensee‘s work, would presumptively 
be copyright misuse. Thus, biographers could not have their right to quote copyrighted 
works controlled by an author‘s estate conditioned on the estate exerting some sort of 
control over what the biographer writes. Nor could the estate threaten to sue the 
biographer for the biographer‘s unlicensed fair use of copyrighted material without 
having to worry that by misusing its copyrights it was taking a risk that it would make 
them unenforceable against anyone. 
As the courts adopt and adapt copyright misuse based on First Amendment speech 
interests, they may find that additional presumptions of misuse are appropriate. For 
instance, courts could say that there is presumptive First Amendment value to the use of 
copyrighted works for purposes of scholarship, commenting on matters of public concern 
or on public figures, or reporting. Thus, copyright misuse can be presumed if a copyright 
holder is found to have taken actions to negatively affect such uses. The copyright holder 
might rebut such a presumption by showing that it took the actions it did for other 
legitimate purposes, and not for the purpose of discouraging scholarship, comment, or 
critique.  
Another way to prevent some of the copyright misuse that is most offensive to 
First Amendment values is to explicitly set out certain actions by copyright holders as 
                                                                                                                                                 
(1984) (stating that copyright act ―is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors 
and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to the 
products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired.‖); U.S. 
v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (noting that ―the reward to the author or 
artist serves to induce release to the public of the products of his creative genius‖). 
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forbidden copyright misuse. Three types of per se misuse might be (1) attempts by a 
copyright holder to gain editorial or narrative control over a work; (2) attempts by a 
copyright holder to cut off areas of inquiry for those using the holder‘s copyrights; or (3) 
attempts by a copyright holder to put certain subject matter out of the bounds of inquiry 
of a user of the copyright holder‘s work. The copyright holder might attempt to gain such 
control over areas of inquiry by exchanging copyright permissions for agreements not to 
write about subjects that the copyright holder does not want discussed. Or, the copyright 
holder might simply use the threat of copyright litigation to browbeat a putative fair user 
into avoiding areas and topics that the copyright holder would like to keep out of bounds. 
Either case should qualify as misuse. 
It is true that a clever copyright holder could still seek to control what is 
investigated by those quoting from its copyrighted works by making any quid pro quos 
implicit, rather than explicit. But even considering some cheating to avoid the per se 
rules, the normative power of the law telling copyright holders and fair users what is in 
and out of bounds is powerful in its own way.
281
  
Moreover, the finding of misuse will provide deterrence to the copyright holder 
against engaging in potential misuse. In infringement cases in which a court determines 
that a copyright owner has engaged in misuse, no further examination of the exhaustive 
factors in the fair use determination need be made. Thus, once the copyright holder has 
been found to have misused its copyrights, a fair user need no longer worry that some of 
her use of the copyright holder‘s work may be found to fall on the infringing side of fair 
use.  
Of course, misuse cannot be found simply because a court determines that a 
copyright holder was wrong about its good-faith belief that certain uses of its copyrighted 
works was infringing. Copyright misuse plainly requires more than simply getting the 
famously difficult determination of fair use wrong. Rather, before ruling that a copyright 
holder has misused its copyright, a court should determine either that the copyright holder 
threatened or pursued litigation without a good-faith belief that the conduct was 
infringing, or that the copyright holder‘s stated position regarding the control its 
copyrights give over others‘ speech was objectively baseless, or that the copyright 
holder‘s threats of litigation rested on objectively baseless grounds, or that  the 
defendant‘s use of plaintiff‘s copyrighted works was plainly not infringing.282 
To the extent that courts adopt presumptions that certain actions by copyright 
holders constitute misuse, a defendant‘s entry of evidence showing that the copyright 
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 Neil MacCormick, Institutional Normative Order:A Conception of Law, 82 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1051, 1063 (1997).  
282
 William F. Patry & Richard A. Posner, Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the Wake of 
Eldred, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1639, 1645 (2004) (―The courts must be careful not to place 
copyright owners on a razor's edge, however, where a mistake in a copyright warning 
precludes enforcement of the copyright (at least until the warning is withdrawn), leading 
them out of an abundance of caution to underenforce their legitimate rights. But where 
the warning grossly and intentionally exaggerates the copyright holder's substantive or 
remedial rights, to the prejudice of publishers of public-domain works, the case for 
invoking the doctrine of copyright misuse seems to us compelling.‖). 
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owner engaged in conduct conforming to one of the presumptions would be misuse 
unless the copyright holder showed why the presumption should not apply in a particular 
case.  
When a court determines that a copyright holder has lost the ability to enforce its 
copyright due to misuse, it will need to determine what conditions need to be met by the 
copyright holder, and how much time will be have to pass before the copyright holder can 
enforce its copyright. The general rule for misuse is that a misuser cannot enforce its 
patent or copyright until it has cured its misuse. To cure a misuse a copyright holder may 
be required to release licensees from any terms or restrictions that constitute misuse, such 
as exchanging permission to quote copyrighted works for promises as to how the would-
be fair user would characterize the information. In cases of prolonged misuse, however, 
like that engaged in by the Joyce Estate,
283
 a court should determine that it takes some 
time to cure the speech chilling effects of prolonged copyright misuse aimed at cutting 
off inquiry that the copyright holder wanted to keep secret. Thus in cases where misuse 
continued for years, it seems perfectly sensible to bar recovery under the copyright 
owner‘s copyrights for a period of years long enough to allow the misuse to be cured. For 
example, if scholars have avoided making fair use of Joyce‘s work for over a decade due 
to the Joyce Estate‘s blustering misuse of its copyrights, then disallowing enforcement of 
the Estate‘s copyrights for a period of years may be appropriate. Obviously the more the 
Estate did to ameliorate the situation, the better its chances would be in returning to court 
and requesting that the court rule the misuse cured sooner than later. 
How would the Shloss case have come out under a copyright misuse defense 
based in First Amendment, rather than  antitrust, principles? Some of the time and 
expense of litigation could have been saved if she had been able to rely on presumptions 
of fair use. The presumption that taking editorial control of a work is misuse would have 
allowed Shloss to simply show the example of how the Joyce Estate granted permission 
to Brenda Maddox to quote from Joyce‘s work on condition that she not discuss Joyce‘s 
daughter, Lucia. Had Shloss showed the other examples of the Joyce Estate‘s misuse of 
its copyrights, a court might have ruled that the Joyce Estate could not enforce its 
copyrights for a set number of years—perhaps 5 or 10 years. Of course the remedies 
cannot become too severe or they will be unfair to the copyright holder. 
It is true that First Amendment based misuse cannot deter all misuses of copyright 
to chill speech. Because copyright holders can dismiss a lawsuit that is going poorly by 
signing a covenant not to sue the would-be fair user of the copyright holder‘s material. 
Thus, a copyright holder will still be able to threaten suit, but avoid a finding of copyright 
misuse by covenanting not to sue the fair user. But if a copyright holder wants to pursue a 
claim through to the merits so as to get a copyright infringement judgment, it will have to 
take the risk of a finding of copyright misuse.  
This will make copyright suits more like patent suits. In patent suits the patent 
owner must be cautious about filing suit, or even threatening suit, because the defendant 
can counterclaim that the patent is invalid. If a patent owner merely threatens to sue, the 
alleged infringer can file a declaratory judgment action seeking to have the patent judged 
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not infringed and invalid. The only way for the patent owner to avoid the risk of having 
its patent ruled invalid (assuming that prior art to do so can be found), is to file a 
covenant not to sue the alleged infringer. While such a covenant preserves the validity of 
the patent, too many covenants like that leave a patent with little value. The same would 
be true for copyright owners. If a copyright owner makes bad-faith threats to sue and then 
backs off when challenged by filing a covenant not to sue, it avoids a finding of misuse, 
but it has now privileged the alleged infringer‘s use, and it has engaged in activity that 
can be relied on to make a misuse argument in every future case seeking to enforce its 
copyrights. Thus we can expect that even though a copyright owner retains a great deal of 
control and can still make a number of threats without much immediate cost to itself, its 
behavior should be moderated by the knowledge that if challenged, its copyright will be 
at risk if it has engaged in behavior that might be found to be misuse.   
Conclusion 
This Article has shown that the First Amendment interests in fair use and in 
creating new work free from the editorial control of copyright holders is inadequately 
protected by the current copyright regime. Under the current regime, copyright holders 
can chill important First Amendment speech by threatening copyright litigation in bad 
faith and with no consequence to themselves. Copyright holders can also control the 
speech of others by only licensing the rights to use their copyrighted materials on 
condition that the copyright holders have editorial control of the new work. A number of 
meritorious legislative solutions have been proposed to help remedy this situation, but 
none has been implemented, nor is any likely to be implemented given the political clout 
of corporate copyright holders. But a solution exists to this problem that courts can 
implement on their own. The equitable defense of copyright misuse is at a crossroads, as 
it has gained acceptance by courts even while the antitrust basis for the defense has been 
seriously undercut by critics. Courts can take this opportunity to shift the policy basis for 
the misuse defense to First Amendment principles so that the defense can be used to deter 
copyright holders engaged in misuse of their copyrights to chill or control the speech of 
others. Only copyright misuse has the features that make it strong enough to adequately 
deter abusive copyright holders bent on chilling speech. The unique deterrent features of 
copyright misuse are: (1) a copyright holder‘s misuse against anyone can be raised as a 
defense in every copyright infringement case, and (2) a finding of misuse makes a 
copyright holder‘s copyrights unenforceable until the misuse is cured. Thus, by shifting 
the policy basis of copyright misuse so that it is planted firmly in First Amendment 
principles, courts can make the legal rights to fair use and free speech actually available 
to the many people who are currently denied the full extent of these rights by the practical 
realities of the current copyright regime.   
